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STARTING OVER:





The father was the primary caretaker for the first three
years of their daughter's life. Then the mother and father
separated, and the mother and child lived together, although the
father continued to be actively involved in the daughter's life.
Two years later, the mother fell in love with and became engaged
to another man and disclosed that she planned to move with the
child to a distant state, where her new husband lived and
worked. The father protested the move and sought a restraining
order.
The court-appointed expert testified that the move would
bring some emotional harm to the child, who would not be able
to see the father as much as she would like to do but noted that
the same would be true if she were not permitted to move with
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her mother. The expert concluded that the mother had carefully
prepared a proposal to adjust for longer periods of access for the
father and that, on balance, was a damage limitation exercise
that called for both parents to minimize any distress to the child
due to the recommended relocation.
This family relocation dispute arose in England' but could
have occurred in Belgium, Brazil, Sweden, Illinois, or in any
other state of the United States. Relocation continues to be the
subject of commentary and law reform around the globe 2 as
lawmakers are confronted by an increasingly mobile generation
of divorced parents who seek new opportunities in reconstituted
families.
Currently, one-half of all American marriages end in
divorce, 3 and most of those marriages produce children. One
million children each year experience the divorce of their
parents, and perhaps as many as 750,000 children will relocate
with their custodial caretaker to a community some distance
from their other parent.4 It is estimated that as many as three
out of four custodial mothers move at least once within the four
years immediately following a divorce. In fact, the most common
family-related reason given for relocation by those surveyed was
a change in marital status.5 Of those relocating, one-half move
more than one time.6 Child custody relocation cases display all
of the thorny, seemingly indeterminate, characteristics of all
other custody disputes and yet carry a special sting: one
1 The trial court permitted the relocation and the appellate court affirmed. See
generally Re H, 1998 Farn. 390 (1998) (reviewing and affirming the trial judge's
judgment that allowed the custodial parent to move from England to America with
her child). Lord Thorpe quoted with approval Lord Ormrod's comments in
Chamberlain v. De La Mare, 13 Fain. 15 (1983), and Poel v. Poel, 1 W.L.R. 1469
(1970).
2 See, e.g., Martha Bailey & Michelle Giroux, Relocation of Custodial Parents:
Final Report, http://www.swc-cfg.gc.ca/pubs/0662634455/199803 
_0662634455
e.html; High-Conflict Custody Cases: Reforming the System for Children-
Conference Report and Action Plan, 34 FAM. L.Q. 589 (2001) (product of the ABA
Family Law Section and the Johnson Foundation, Sept. 8-10, 2000).
3 E. Mavis Hetherington et al., What Matters? What Does Not?: Five
Perspectives on the Association Between Marital Transitions and Children's
Adjustment, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 167, 167 (1998).
4 Anne L. Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Post-divorce Children: Relocation, the
Constitution and the Courts, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 3.
5 Jason Schachter, Why People Move: Exploring the March 2000 Current
Population Survey, U.S. Census Bureau, May 2001, http://www.census.gov/
population /www/ soc demo /migrate.html.
6 Spitzer, supra note 4, at 3.
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concerned, loving, and responsible parent may lose his
relationship with his child through no fault of his own, and the
child may also be harmed by the loss of that relationship. The
custodian who wants to relocate with the child, however, usually
also can present an appealing claim that the move will bring
substantial benefits: more family income, enhanced educational
opportunities, and proximity to extended family members. Each
parent asserts that his or her position will better serve the
child's interests. It is hard to imagine a more difficult
reallocation decision for the family members, courts, and
scholars seeking optimal guidelines for such decision making.
Divorce always brings family reconstitution-often in a
different locale. Relocation impasse cases have become a
phenomenon engendering public concern, study, and reform
proposals as well as polemics, diatribes, and pontifications.
Relocation is a burning issue in the European community,
Canada, Australia, and the United States. It is an issue that has
occasioned conferences 7, symposia, international surveys, and an
agenda item for feminists8 and fathers9 around the world. It is
an issue that has divided social scientists ° and baffled appellate
courts. Because the predominant legal standard-what is in the
"best interests of the child"-is so imprecise, every potential
decision maker is inclined to shuffle off the resolution to someone
else in a wondrous modern parody of the nursery rhyme "This is
the House that Jack Built."
7 See, e.g., Symposium, From Partners to Parents: Toward a Child-Centered
Family Law Jurisprudence, Jan. 10, 1999, http://www.uky.edulaw/aals-intchild
.htm.
s As June Carbone so aptly observed, "The battle lines in these disputes are
well drawn[,] and they are gendered ones." The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle:
Creating a New Model of Parental Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1091, 1095
(1998); see, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957 (1998) (collecting American feminists' voices); Ruth
Deech, The Rights of Fathers: Social and Biological Concepts of Parenthood, in
PARENTHOOD IN MODERN SOCIETY 19, 31 (John Eekelaar & Peter Sarcevic eds.,
1993). In the major Canadian relocation case, Gordon v. Goertz , 2 S.C.R. 27 (1996),
the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund appeared as intervenors. See Bailey
& Giroux, supra note 2.
9 David Blankenhorn, Chairman of the National Fatherhood Initiative and
President of the Institute for American Values, has written extensively in support of
policies protective of the father-child relationship. See, e.g., David Blankenhorn, The
State of the Family and the Family Policy Debate, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 431
(1996). See generally DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING
OUR MOST URGENT PROBLEM 201 (1995).
1o See infra notes 144-46.
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The absence of rules with a dollop of opportunistic behavior
inclines parents to litigate and leave the custody determination
to the judge. The trial court, charged with the impossible task of
predicting the future behaviors and circumstances of the mother,
father, and child-rather than its familiar role of finding the
salient facts of past events-wants an expert to tell it what to do.
The expert, usually a clinician with few powers of accurate
prognostication, 1 wants illumination from empiricists who
respond that they can only speak to aggregate probabilities and
not individual families, fathers, mothers, or children. Appellate
courts wrap about them their mantle of deference to the
participant-observer trial court,12 duly noting the legislature's
grant of broad discretion to the fact finder.' 3 A final judgment is
imprinted, which is only final until the next round when one of
the parents seeks its modification.
In the twentieth century, the state's parens patriae role in
protecting the children of divorce has been focused on developing
the optimal substantive standard for resolving child custody
disputes. That same preoccupation has characterized the
scholarship aimed at resolving relocation cases: what rule should
be used to decide whether to approve the move? Should there be
a presumption in favor of the primary residential custodian or
the nonmoving parent? What parenting behaviors are relevant
to this determination? Is a particular rule gender-biased or not?
Each proposal for a substantive relocation rule is flawed, though
11 As Anna Freud warned, it is impossible to predict how any particular child
will fare in the future or to make meaningful comparisons between future
alternative placements for an individual child. See Anna Freud, Child Observation
and Prediction of Development: Memorial Lecture in Honour of Ernst Kris, 13 THE
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 92, 97-98 (1958).
12 In her early seminal article, Joan G. Wexler noted the general proposition
that in her study of custody modification actions, appellate courts typically affirmed
the trial court. See Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE
L.J. 757, 762 (1985). Our study of all reported relocation decisions during the past
three years shows that the appellate court affirmed 110 of 151, or 70%, of the cases.
It did not seem to matter what rule was in play or whether the trial court granted
relocation or denied it. Trial courts have considerable discretion and exercise it with
apparent abandon. For example, though Quebec and the common law provinces of
Canada have different relocation standards, a recent report indicates that the trial
courts' decisions are not dramatically different. In both Canadian legal systems,
relocation was granted in a majority of cases. See Bailey & Giroux, supra note 2.
13 See, e.g., Mullis v. Brennan, 716 N.E.2d 58, 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999);
Hrusovsky v. Benjamin, 274 A.D.2d 674, 676, 710 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (3d Dep't
2000); Adelsperger v. Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
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some are more seriously flawed than others. After two decades
of doctrinal development, no optimal rule for resolving disputed
relocation has emerged.
The thesis of this Article is that relocation issues, like all
other issues affecting children, should be resolved by the parents
themselves because, both during their relationship and after
their separation, they are the most concerned and most
knowledgeable about their child's best interests. I will conclude
that the process of resolving relocation disputes, through the use
of counseling, education, and mediation should, to the maximum
extent possible, be substituted for litigation. In an ideal world,
litigation should be foreclosed. Nonetheless, realizing that
negotiation and mediation will not work for all parties and that
substantive rules do provide incentives and risks that impact
parties' willingness to negotiate, choices of substantive rules in
litigation must be considered.
Part I of this Article lays out the evolution of the doctrinal
backdrop of the particular issue of relocation. Until 150 years
ago, child custody disputes, including residential decisions, were
non-justiciable. The story of the twentieth century is open-ended
custody litigation, and that development has worked great
mischief. Part II focuses exclusively on the spread of American
litigation rules for resolving custodian relocation. This
demonstration proves that the substantive rules governing the
litigation of relocation disputes are non-rules because they do not
produce predictable results and encourage litigation.
Furthermore, this Article highlights that the substantive
standards apply across the board and do not distinguish between
disputes in which there are significant noncustodial
relationships at risk and those in which there are not.
The reform goal of Part III refocuses concern only upon
disputes in which there is a significant relationship at stake. In
cases in which there is only an inchoate relationship, the
custodial parent ought to be able to relocate, subject only to an
extremely strong showing by the other, inactive parent of harm
to the child from the relocation. For the smaller pool of
controversies that remain, the best available substantive rule is
determined using two principal criteria: first, potential to
encourage negotiation and discourage litigation; and second,
ability to diminish the five major stressors for children of
separated parents. The conundrum confessed here, at the
2003]
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outset, is that any rule that narrows the grounds for litigation
may also empower one party to be less willing to negotiate in
good faith.
Ultimately, the least detrimental alternative rule is one
requiring that, when an objection is filed by the noncustodial
parent, the potential relocation parent must carry a three-fold
burden of proof: (1) that counseling and mediation have been
attempted in good faith and failed; (2) that the relocating parent
has provided a reasonable plan for ensuring and supporting the
child's continuing relationship with the other parent, including
the sharing of contact costs; and (3) that the direct benefits for
the child of the move outweigh the particular harm of the loss of
significant, frequent contact enjoyed by the child and the other
parent. Though a close call, placing the burden of proof upon the
relocating parent seems necessary to induce that parent to
negotiate and to offer sufficient inducements for remodeling the
other parent-child relationship.
Part IV considers how the process of resolving relocation
disputes might be re-engineered to encourage mediation and
avoid needless conflict. What is the responsibility of the state, as
parens patriae, when it confers the right to divorce and
adjudicates parental rights? How can the harm to a child be
minimized? This section suggests that the most important
changes the legal system should make involve altering the
processes used to resolve parents' future relationships with the
child, despite the relocation.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
CONCERN
The notion that a child's interests are independent and
severable from those of his caretakers, much less that they ought
to be superior considerations, is a recent invention. The common
law accorded great authority to a minor's father and later, when
custody disputes became justiciable, to the child's guardian. 14
The guardian, historically the father, had sole decision-making
authority and was not even required to consult with the other
parent on any matters of upbringing. Unless the father granted
14 See Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best
Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY
L.J. 209, 209 (1978).
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access to his children's mother, she had no cause of action to
force him to permit her to see her children 15 until 1839 when
"Talfourd's Law" was enacted by Parliament. 16 Residential
decisions clearly fell within the custodian's prerogatives. By the
late nineteenth century, in the early hours of parens patriae,17
the Field Code of 1865 stated only slightly more restrictively: "A
parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change his
residence, subject to the power of the .... [trial] court [in New
York] to restrain a removal which would prejudice the rights or
welfare of the child."' 8 But certainly the courts' prevailing
attitude, for over a century, in the common law and American
systems was custodial deference.
In the development of the concept of parental authority, the
civil law recognized that parents share parental authority during
15 In Rex v. Greenhill, 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (KB. 1836), the mother left with her
three small children to live with her relatives when the husband abandoned them to
live with his mistress. Id. at 923. The father brought habeas corpus to force the
children's return to his household. Id. The court held that no right existed under
British law to deny the father custody of the children of the marriage. Id. at 924.
Resorting to self-help, the mother fled with the children to Europe. Id. at 926. See
generally Ann Sumner Holmes, "Fallen Mothers": Maternal Adultery and Child
Custody in England, 1886-1925, in MATERNAL INSTINCTS: VISIONS OF
MOTHERHOOD AND SEXUALITY IN BRITAIN, 1875-1925 37 (C. Nelson & A. Holmes
eds., 1997).
16 An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Custody of Infants, 1839, 2 & 3
Vict., c. 54 (Eng.). Rather curiously, Serjeant Talfourd introduced this piece of
legislation although Talfourd had represented the father in Greenhill. See Greenhill,
111 Eng. Rep. 922, 926 (KB. 1836); Sanford N. Katz, "That They May Thrive" Goal
of Child Custody: Reflections on the Apparent Erosion of the Tender Years
Presumption and the Emergence of the Primary Caretaker Presumption, 8 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y, 123, 126 (1992).
Although Lord Mansfield had earlier coined the "best interest of the child" test
in Blissets Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 899 (KB. 1774) ("If the parties are disagreed, the
court will do what shall appear best for the child."), it lay dormant for sixty years.
See generally Holmes, supra note 15; Ramsay Laing Klaff, The Tender Years
Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335 (1982).
17 Although Custer traces the doctrine to the early seventeenth century in
England, it was not well established as judicial doctrine until the late eighteenth
century. Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27
EMORY L.J. 195, 195 (1978). It is possible, however, that the original seeds for
parens patriae were sown in the Roman concept of patronus causarum, which
obligated patricians to serve as protectors of not only of their own households but
also of weaker members of society. See J.A. CROOK, LEGAL ADVOCACY IN THE
ROMAN WORLD 31-33 (1995) (discussing the Roman patronage system).
18 NEW YORK (STATE) COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, THE CIVIL CODE OF NEW
YORK § 104 (1865); see Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of
Children and Custodial Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245,
251 (1996).
20031
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
marriage and joint authority continues upon divorce. 19 Thus,
although a custodian could unilaterally make daily decisions
affecting the child, major decisions required concurrence.
Whatever force that principle may have historically carried,
today civil jurisdictions have extended the custodial parent's
authority to encompass major decisions, subject only to the other
parent's general oversight, right to be informed of all major
decisions, and right to seek court review of all decisions.20
During this century, the best interests of the child standard
has been the prevailing, indeed near universal, test in the
United States for the resolution of child custody litigation waged
between parents, at least in the initial round of conflict. 21 This
same best interests standard was also used in custody
modification actions until the late 1960s. Custody modification
actions arise out of changes in the circumstances of the parents
and child, including the moral, mental, or physical condition of a
parent; changes in the household composition such as the
remarriage of a custodian; changes in the physical environment
in which the child is living; challenges to child-harming decisions
made by the custodian; the wishes of the child; and changes in
the needs of the child.
Traditionally, the parent seeking modification only needed
to prove that some change had occurred since the first decree
and that it jeopardized the child's best interests, therefore
justifying the reconsideration of custody. Social policy favoring
the finality of judgments was rather handily outweighed by
concern for the welfare of the child.22 Finding change in the life
19 See FR. C. CIV., art. 288, 373 (1994) (articulation of the French Civil Code).
20 See QUE. C. CIV., art. 80 (1981); FR. C. civ, art. 288 (1994).. The Belgian Civil
Code similarly does not specifically address relocation and therefore, apparently the
general authority of the court to determine where a child will live if his parents
disagree governs these disputes. See BELG. C. civ, art. 373 (1982). Rejecting its civil
law roots, Louisiana has by statute singled out relocation as a decision requiring
mutual consent or court order. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:355.1-
9:355.17 (West 2000).
In 1989, Great Britain rejected the concept of custody and now refers to the
parental responsibility of both parents during marriage and after divorce. Children
Act, 1989, c. 41(Eng.). Thus, today there is a remarkable convergence of doctrine on
the European continent.
21 See Katz, supra note 16, at 127-30. The first American case to resurrect Lord
Mansfield's phrase, "best interests of the child," is thought to be Commonwealth v.
Addicks, 2 Serg. & Rawle 174 (Pa. 1815). See infra notes 99-101 (discussing British
precedent).
22 The judicial role has always been to protect the best interests of the child.
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of a child is as easy as finding sunshine in Florida. A child
morphs, sometimes dramatically over the course of years,
months, or even weeks, and her physical, mental, moral, and
emotional needs shift with those changes; a child is effectively a
"moving target of social policy."23 Once the subject of litigation,
the child is always thereafter considered to be in custodia legis-
in the breast of the court's concern-and thus, actions to modify
the terms of an original decree frequently occur. Indeed, post-
divorce litigation between former spouses over issues of custody,
alimony, or child support has been found to be the most
disputatious and litigious type of grievance in American
culture.24
By the late 1960s, though the path was never straight, there
was some evidence that courts were beginning to apply a more
stringent standard in order to minimize the disruptive effect
upon both families and courts caused by the onslaught of
modification actions. 25 Limiting reconsideration of custodial
arrangements became one of the reform goals of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act promulgated in 1970,26 which called
for a showing of serious endangerment to the child by any party
seeking custody modification.27  In 1973, the publication of
"Beyond the Best Interests of the Child"28 documented the harm
Michael King & Judith Trowell, Responding to People's Needs: An Issue of Law, in A
READER ON FAMILY LAW 311, 312-14 (E.E.Kel AAR & Maclean eds., 1994)
23 John E. Coons et al., Puzzling over Children's Rights, 1991 BYU. L. REV. 307,
341 (1991).
24 See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 525, 534 (1980-81). The
survey sampled 1,000 randomly-selected American households in each of five
federal judicial districts. They screened out minor disputes involving values of less
than $1,000. See id. at 534-35. A study of contested divorces found that although
only 5% of those not involving children returned to court, 52% involving child
custody resulted in re-litigation. One-third of those were re-litigated two to ten
times. Jack C. Westman et al., Role of Child Psychiatry in Divorce, 23 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 416, 417 (1970). See generally Sally Burnett Sharp, Modification
of Agreement-Based Custody Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard, 68 VA. L. REV.
1263 (1982).
25 See Wexler, supra note 12, at 762 (summarizing modification of doctrinal
development).
26 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 101-506, 9A U.L.A. 171-549 (1973).
27 Section 409 recognized that the parents themselves could agree to
modification but absent consensual changes, the redactors sought to enhance the
child's stability and the finality of custody determinations. See id. at § 409 cmt. at
439; see also infra text accompanying notes 114-24.
28 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 35
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caused to children by instability and uncertainty in their living
arrangements and fueled the reform movement. As Anna Freud
and her colleagues recommended, anxiety caused by the
possibility of legal intervention could be minimized by reducing
the justiciability of the noncustodial parent's complaints. Each
child's placement should be "final and unconditional and ...
pending final placement a child must not be shifted to accord
with each tentative decision."29 Today, many courts impose a
higher standard of proof upon a petitioner for custody
modification.30
The proposed relocation of a child's primary domiciliary
custodian 3' to a new home some distance away from the child's
current residence is indisputably a substantial change in
circumstances. 32 Therefore, relocation represents a particular
species of proposed change that is justiciable and can trigger
judicial modification of domiciliary custody and access rights for
the noncustodial parent. Although relocation disputes might
have been disposed of under the general rules for modification
actions, during the last decade, most states have either enacted
(1973).
29 Id. at 35. In addition, the authors wrote BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD in 1979 and, with Sonja Goldstein substituting for the late Anna Freud, THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE in 1996.
This trilogy has been called "the most influential text of this generation." Michael
Freeman, The Best Interests of the Child? Is the Best Interests of the Child in the
Best Interests of Children?, 11 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 360, 360 (1997).
30 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 20.9 (2d ed. 1989);
see, e.g., American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations § 2.17, at 332 (Final Draft 2000) [hereinafter ALI
Proposal] (requiring a showing of substantial change and modification necessary to
the child's welfare). See generally Wexler, supra note 12.
31 Increased sensitivity to the co-parenting objective of modern custody law has
resulted in the re-labeling of "custodian" and "visiting parent" in many jurisdictions.
See In re Marriage of Kovacs, 854 P.2d 629, 632 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (noting that,
in 1987, Washington completely changed the legal labels in a re-conceptualization of
family relationships, substituting for example, "parenting plan" for "custody" and
"parental functions" for "visitation." (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.260
(West 1996))). Similar changes have occurred elsewhere. "Primary custodial parent"
is also now known as the "residence parent" and the visiting parent is known as the
"contact parent" in England and Wales. See Children Act, 1989, c. 41 (Eng.). French
law refers to "le parent chez lequel 'enfant a sa residence habituelle" [the parent
with whom the child usually resides). FR. C. CIV., art. 288 (1994). The ALI proposal
substitutes for primary domiciliary parent, the term "parent exercising significant
majority of custodial responsibility." ALI proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17(4)(a).
32 See, e.g., Fields v. Fields, 749 N.E.2d 100, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); In re
Marriage of Flynn, 972 P.2d 500, 503 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
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special relocation statutes or crafted special jurisprudential
rules. Furthermore, both the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers (AAML) 33 and the American Law Institute34 have
chosen to treat relocation as a custody decision meriting distinct
considerations.
II. RELOCATION RULES
Unlike initial and modification actions on other grounds,
relocation cases display remarkably similar features. The child's
primary custodial parent desires to move with the child to some
other jurisdiction; in contested actions the typical move is to
another state and at some distance from the child's current home
and community. Sometimes the parent seeks to move for
reasons that purely concern the child's welfare. Justifications
might include the need to seek medical treatment, 35 to reunite
the child with some important relative or other significant
individual, to remove the child from danger, 36 or otherwise to
meet the special needs or talents of the particular child. Such
circumstances would ordinarily incline a court to approve the
proposed relocation, finding that the advantage to the child from
the relocation would outweigh any harm to the other parent and
to the child from any disruption of their relationship. However,
such child-centered justifications for relocation are not the
scenarios that are being litigated. As might be predicted,
relocating parents are not being challenged when these purposes
are asserted.
Instead, the reported cases involve relocation motivated that
is not primarily to benefit the child, but rather to benefit the
minor's custodial parent. The custodial parent seeks to move for
an equally predictable array of personal benefits: the parent has
33 The Bd. of Governors of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
(AAML) adopted the Proposed Model Relocation Act in Cancun, Mexico, on March 9,
1997. MODEL RELOCATION ACT (Am. Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers, Proposed Draft,
1997) [hereinafter AAML Proposed Model Relocation Act], http://www.aaml.
org/Model%20 Relocation %20Act.htm.
34 See ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17 at 354-56; infra text accompanying
notes 99-112 (discussing the ALI Proposal).
35 See Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 219 (N.J. 2001) (involving a proposed
move to Wisconsin where mother's parents could help provide special care for an
autistic child).
36 See Bobadilla v. Bobadilla, No. FA 980116158, 2000 WL 1819680, at *1, *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2000) (involving a claim that the former spouse had
sexually abused the custodian parent's child by a previous marriage).
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remarried and the new spouse-stepparent has been transferred
to another state 7 or wants to establish a home elsewhere;38 the
parent needs to seek a more healthful environment 39 or
otherwise meet special needs of other family members; 40 the
parent wants to be among extended family or a supportive group
of friends; 41  the parent has found better employment
opportunities; 42  the parent wants to pursue educational
opportunities; 43 relocation will reduce the parent's commuting
time to work.44
Conversely, the custodial parent may plan to move in order
to escape spousal abuse, to decrease interaction and conflict with
a former spouse to minimize what the custodial parent perceives
as the other parent's harmful influence upon the child,45 or to
37 See Franz v. Franz, 737 So. 2d 943, 944 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Hayes v.
Gallacher, 972 P.2d 1138, 1139 (Nev. 1999); Mealy v. Arnold, 733 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999).
38 See Nighswander v. Sudick, No. FA 97393793, 2000 WL 157905, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2000) (including a stepfather and custodian parent who found
employment in another state); Rosenthal v. Maney, 745 N.E.2d 350, 352 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2001); Boling v. Dixon, 29 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Tomasko v.
Dubuc, 761 A.2d 407, 408 (N.H. 2000); Evans v. Evans, 530 S.E.2d 576, 577-79
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Ferdinand v. Ferdinand, 763 A.2d 820, 821 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000); Schremp v. Schremp, 2000 WL 1839127, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Cloutier
v. Queen, 545 S.E.2d 574, 577 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
39 See Braun v. Headley, 750 A.2d 624, 627 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
40 See In re Marriage of Thielges, 623 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000)
(custodial mother desired to return to home state because parents needed her
assistance); In re Marriage of Flynn, 972 P.2d 500, 501, 505 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(custodial mother desired to relocate to be near her father who was dying of cancer;
court remanded to permit a hearing).
41 See In re Marriage of Bryant, 91 Cal. App. 4th 789, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001);
Baugher v. Baugher, 774 A.2d 1089, 1090 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); Jack v. Clinton,
609 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Neb. 2000).
42 See Freidrich v. Bevis, 9 S.W.3d 556, 557 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000); Muniz v.
Muniz, 789 So. 2d 370, 371-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Fridley v. Fridley, 748
N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); In the Interest of S.E.P. & M.C.P. v. Petry, 35
S.W.3d 862, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Brown v. Brown, 621 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Neb.
2000); Chen v. Heller, 759 A.2d 873, 875 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); Salichs v.
James, 268 A.D.2d 168, 169-72, 708 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386-89 (1st Dep't 2000); Olson v.
Olson, 611 N.W.2d 892, 894 (N.D. 2000); Kaiser v. Kaiser, 23 P.3d 278, 280 (Okla.
2001); Anderson v. McVay, 743 A.2d 472, 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
43 See Wagner v. Wagner, 45 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001).
44 See McAlister v. McAlister, 747 A.2d 390, 391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
45 See In the Interest of S.E.P. & M.C.P., 35 S.W.3d at 866 (mother alleging that
father was involved in drug abuse and that the children feared for their safety,
though the court did not make findings of fact or rest its decision on this allegation).
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frustrate the other parent's attempts to remain in a relationship
with the child.46
All relocation disputes will inherently produce disruption of
the child's physical environment and personal relationships. All
relocation disputes will also carry the cost of diminished
frequency of contact between the child and the noncustodial
parent. Indisputably, relocation after a divorce constitutes a
second uprooting, a second loss for the child. Equally
predictable, the child, especially an adolescent, will resist change
and the need to overcome inertia, to start over in some new
place.47
All states, British Commonwealth countries, and the
member states of the European Union use the best interests of
the child as the touchstone for all custody cases, including
relocation disputes. 48  However, in the United States,
substantive variations are much more apparent. In large
measure, this difference may be attributable to the shift in the
United States away from concerns about the difficulties of
interstate enforcement, which are now largely resolved by the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.
49
Inter-country dispute enforcement under the Hague
Convention 5° remains problematic.
There are four distinct approaches to the justiciability and
resolution of relocation cases now current among American
jurisdictions. These views are laid out in a progression from
46 See Braun v. Headley, 750 A.2d 624, 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Mason v.
Mason, 975 P.2d 340, 341 (Nev. 1999) (finding that the mother's most likely motive
was to frustrate the father's visitation rights based at least in part upon the fact
that the mother had not secured a job offer in Florida although, she wanted to move
there).
47 See Muniz, 789 So. 2d at 372; Jantz v. Brewer, 30 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000); Mealy v. Arnold, 733 A.2d 652, 656 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
48 The best interests of the child principle permeates the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Convention on the Rights of the Child,
United Nations, 28 I.L.M. 1448, arts. 9, 10, 18 (1989) (adopted by the U.N. GAOR on
Nov. 20, 1989 and entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). This Convention has been
ratified by 170 nations, including all states of the European Union. The United
States has not ratified it.
49 See generally 9 U.L.A. 655 (1999) (Supp. 2000); see also the Federal Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1995).
50 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Oct. 25, 1980, available at
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/text28e.html. The U.S. Congress enacted
implementing legislation in the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994).
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unpredictability to predictability of litigation and relative
certainty of result. If anything, it is an understatement that this
area of the law has been "unusually unstable."51 However, there
appears to be a pattern and perhaps even a trend toward
permitting relocations. 52
Before turning to that analysis, a caveat seems in order.
Much fictionalizing, posturing, or conceptual sleight of hand
colors this area of the law. Courts often display a rather
stunning jingoism to deny what appear to be reasonable requests
to relocate. 53 As trial lawyers advising how to oppose a custodial
move have put it, "Do not overlook your 'home court advantage.'
Present your case with the presumption that the judge will take
some pride in the place he or she has chosen to live."54 Courts
comment at length about the importance of the relationship
between the child and the would-be left-behind parent and their
parens patriae obligation to restrain efforts that would harm the
child. However, rarely do they mention that such lofty
sentiments have never been invoked to restrain the announced
relocation of a noncustodial parent to whom the child was deeply
attached. 55 Gender bias and personal bias also occasionally
surface. For example, in a Nevada case, the trial judge
remarked in open court that he once had been separated from
his son and that the separation had strained their relationship;
furthermore, he cautioned that if relocation were granted, the
parties' child would either feel betrayed by his father or the child
would replace him with the stepfather. The appellate court
affirmed the decision, finding that the judge had not improperly
injected his own experiences into the proceeding. The appellate
court did not comment as to whether a broad substantive
standard invited such projections. 56
51 ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17, Rptr's com. d. at 376.
52 See Miggins v. Senofonte, No. FA 303903685, 1996 WL 456332 (Conn. Super.
Ct. July 26, 1996).
53 See, e.g., Ramos v. Ramos, 697 So. 2d 280, 283 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
54 Dorene Marcus & Jeffrey I. Garfinkel, The Trial: Opposing Relocation, 20
FAM. ADvoc. 41, 42 (1997).
55 The rare recording of this insight occurred in Judge Pressler's early decision
in D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), affd per
curiam, 365 A.2d 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
56 Trent v. Trent, 890 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Nev. 1995).
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A. The Moving Parent's Double Burden: Relocation in Good
Faith and in the Best Interests of the Child
The majority of states cast the burden of proof upon the
relocating parent to justify the proposed change of
circumstances. That stance is an application of the ordinary
custody modification proof allocations: the party who seeks a
revision of a judgment bears the burden of showing that the
revision is warranted. Most states continue to use the
comfortable old shoe, "best interests of the child" test for
relocation decisions. 57 Often they attempt to lay out a list of
factors with the purpose of providing some guidance for parents,
negotiators, and decision makers.58  These "laundry lists"59
typically include consideration of the moving parent's motives,
requiring assurance that relocation is proposed for "legitimate"
or "good faith" reasons other than to thwart the child's
relationship with the other parent. This is the model endorsed
by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers ("AAML
Model Relocation Act"). There is no presumption either for or
against relocation; 60 the moving parent must prove that the
move is in the best interests of the child.
57 In early decisions, the burden of proof was upon the departing parent to show
that relocation would produce "real advantage" for the custodian and child that
would overcome the impairment of the relationship between the child and the non-
relocating parent as the primary consideration in the assessment of the best
interests of the child. The apparent source of this standard was D'Onofrio v.
D'Onofrio, a very influential New Jersey decision. 365 A.2d at 30. New Jersey has
since abandoned that separate hurdle and uses instead the best interests test. See,
e.g., Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 224 (N.J. 2001). Although Nevada continues to
impose this separate requirement upon the relocating parent, the permitted and
satisfactory proofs are indistinguishable from those used by courts adopting the best
interests burden of proof. See, e.g., Dick v. Dick, 383 N.W.2d 240 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985); Mason v. Mason, 975 P.2d 340 (Nev. 1999); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 812 P.2d
1268 (Nev. 1991). Jurisdictions that follow the best interests rule include Alabama
and Alaska. See McQuade v. McQuade, 901 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1995); Ex parte
Monroe, 727 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1999).
58 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (2001); Tropea
v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727; 665 N.E.2d 145, 642 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1996); Olson v. Olson,
611 N.W.2d 892 (N.D. 2000).
59 Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American
Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Individual
Child's Best Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467, 472 (1999).
60 The AAML Proposed Model Relocation Act leaves open the use of a
presumption, giving states three choices: placing the burden of proof on the
relocating parent to show good faith and that the move is in the best interests of the
child; placing the burden of proof on the non-relocating parent to show that the
move is proposed in bad faith and the relocation is not in the child's best interests;
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The factors constituting the best interests analysis are
remarkably similar from state to state.61 The AAML Model
Relocation Act lists the following factors:
(1) the quality of the relationship of child with relocating
parent and with non-relocating parent, siblings, and other
significant persons;
(2) the age, developmental stage, and needs of the child, as well
as the impact of the relocation on the child;
(3) the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
non-relocating parent and the child through suitable visitation
arrangements, including a consideration of logistics and
finances;
(4) the child's preference, taking into account age and maturity;
(5) whether the relocating parent has established a pattern of
conduct promoting or thwarting a relationship with the non-
relocating parent;
(6) whether relocation will enhance the quality of life of the
relocating parent and child, including financial, emotional, and
educational opportunity;
(7) the reasons advanced for or opposed to relocation. 62
Finally, dispelling any doubt that this standard is intended
to be more limited than the best interests grab-bag, the AAML
Model Relocation Act concludes by authorizing the court to
consider "any other factor affecting the best interest of the
child."63 Louisiana has adopted the AAML Model Relocation
or splitting and then shifting the burden of proof by placing the initial burden of
proof upon the relocating parent to show good faith and, if that burden is satisfied,
then shifting the burden to the nonrelocating parent to show non-relocation is not in
the best interests of the child. See AAML Proposed Model Relocation Act, supra note
33; see also infra Part II.B.
Florida has experimented with the third option. In Russenberger v.
Russenberger, 669 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Fla. 1996), the Supreme Court of Florida held
that upon a showing of good faith, a custodial parent is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption in favor of relocation, taking in account the child's best interests.
However, the Florida legislature subsequently amended its statutes in 1997 to
reject explicitly the use of any presumption in favor of the relocating parent. FLA.
STAT., ch. 97-242, § 2 (amending § 61.13, effective July 1, 1997).
61 Indeed, factors commonly identified are quite similar from country to
country. See, e.g., B and B: Family Law Reform Act 1995, 21 Fam. L.R. 676, J 9.62
(1997) (providing a listing of the Family Court of Australia at Brisbane).
62 AAML Proposed Model Relocation Act, supra note 33, § 405.
63 Id. § 405(8).
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Act,64 and Delaware courts have "adopted recommendations set
forth by the [AAMLI. "65 While not adopting the AAML Model
Relocation Act, several other states impose the double burden
upon the moving parent of showing a good faith justification for
the move and that the move serves the child's best interests. 66
1. Consideration of the Child's Preference
Of special interest in the AAML list is the injunction to
attend to "the child's preference, taking into account age and
maturity." Nearly all states have statutes that either require or
permit the court to consider a child's preference, usually as part
of the assessment of a child's best interests.67 Although the
child's wishes are not binding,68 they are relevant, and there may
be an implied duty upon the court to ensure that the child's
views are elicited if the child desires to be heard or to inquire if
the child would like to be heard. In the last quarter century,
throughout the world, custody law has been modified to include
consideration of the child's views and preferences. Article 12 of
the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which speaks directly to the role of the child in custody matters,
requires state parties "to assure to the child who is capable of
forming his or her own views the right to express those views
freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child
being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity
of the child."69
64 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355 (West 1997).
65 See E.G. v. S.G., No. CN97-10889, 1999 WL 33100128 (Del. Fain. Ct.).
66 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.377 (West 2001); Brown v. Brown, 621
N.W.2d 70, 77 (Neb. 2000); Rice v. Rice, 517 S.E.2d 220, 222 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999).
67 Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law:
Redefining Families, Reforming Custody Jurisdiction, and Refining Support Issues,
34 FAM. L.Q. 607, 654 (2001) (survey of custody criteria found that all but four
states considered a child's wishes); see also ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.09.
68 Two American jurisdictions make the choice of an older child binding.
Mississippi permits a child of twelve to elect the parent with whom he or she would
live, provided only that the elected parent is fit. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65(1)(a)
(2001). In Georgia the age is fourteen. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a)(4) (2001). Even in
states that do not legislatively confer such power upon a child, an older child's
preference is very persuasive. In a Virginia study, nearly 90% of the judges reported
that the preferences of adolescents were either "dispositive... or extremely
important." Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Children's Preference in Adjudicated Custody
Decisions, 22 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1050 (1988).
69 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 48, art. 12. In addition,
Article 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, sets out a
20031
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An intrinsic problem with children's preferences, however,
inherent in the very nature of immaturity is short-sightedness.
As one psychiatrist has observed,
In conducting custody evaluations, I routinely ask children for
three wishes. In almost every case, children wish that the
family would stay together or get back together. This occurs
even when children recognize that their parents will not get
back together and that the parents' doing so would be a disaster
for the family. In one such case a seven-year-old girl told me, "I
think my parents would end up killing each other, but I still
wish they would get back together."70
Children desperately desire the reunification of their
parents; they fantasize and scheme about the possibility, and
when hope fades, they are often angry at their parents.
Relocation clearly dashes such hope and resistance to the move,
perhaps accompanied with anger, can be anticipated. 71 The few
existing studies of the impact of children's preferences on trial
court decision making suggest that judges are appropriately
skeptical of children's opinions and are capable of sorting out
creditable reasons for a stance.72
number of procedural and substantive rights of the child, including the right to
"express their views freely .... on matters which concern them in accordance with
their age and maturity." Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
Dec. 18, 2000, 364 OFFICIAL J. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1, 13 (2000). Under Art. 13 of the
Hague Convention, a defense to an action seeking a child's return is that the child
objects. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra
note 50, art. 13. Commentators have reported that the courts of most countries have
been willing to give weight to the objections of children as young as nine to justify a
refusal of their return. See generally Carolyn Hamilton & Kate Standley, European
Family Law, in FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 549, 572 (Carolyn Hamilton & Kate
Standley eds., 1995).
Each of these compacts stops short of requiring appointment of an independent
representative for the child. This right, however, is included in a convention
currently enforced in Greece only. See European Convention on the Exercise of
Children's Rights, Jan. 25, 1996, Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. No. 160.
70 Samuel Roll, How a Child Views the Move, 20 FAM. ADvoc. 26, 28 (1997).
71 See generally JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING
THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) (finding
that anger was typically directed toward the child's primary caretaker, a target who
would probably be less likely to reject the child because of the anger).
72 See JEFF ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE § 4-53 (2d. ed.
2002). The child's volunteered preference was followed in two-thirds of the 1300
decisions surveyed from 1982-1983. Id. An analysis of 272 San Diego custody
decisions in 1982 revealed that the judge appeared influenced by the child's
preference in only 15% of the cases. Carla C. Kunin et al., An Archival Study of
Decison-Making in Child Custody Disputes, 48 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 564, 572
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There may be some marginal cases in which the child's
preferences so sharply diverge from those negotiated by his
parents or the child surfaces some hidden family secret that
would influence the choice of custodial arrangements. Generally,
however, researchers do not report children's distress that their
wishes were rejected but anger at having no role, at being
ignored, and at not being consulted about custodial
arrangements. It appears that children are most insulted and
troubled by being ignored and pushed to the sidelines.7 3
In sum, the real issue is not whether the child's preferences
ought to be heard but how much weight should be ascribed to a
child's choice between relocating and remaining in the same
community (albeit perhaps with another parent custodian).
Research suggests that the court should hear from any older
child who wants to be heard,74 though some delicacy is required
to avoid adding to the pressure a child may feel from choosing
between parents or commenting on their comparative
capabilities. Even nine-year-olds have been found generally
capable of giving reliable evidence75 and of making informed and
mature judgments. 76 Whether attributed to the "emotional
state,"77 the impact of developmental differences, 78 or its value
laden nature,7 9 social scientists caution that a mature minor's
competence to make an informed choice about medical treatment
(1992). See generally Kathleen Nemechek, Child Preference in Custody Decisions:
Where We Have Been, Where We Are Now, Where We Should Go, 83 IOWA L. REV.
437 (1998).
73 See JUDITH S.WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A
25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000).
74 See Scott et al., supra note 68, at 1046-50.
75 See generally LUCY S. MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1994).
76 See Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and
Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV.. 1589, 1596
(1982) (comparing the responses of nine, fourteen, eighteen and twenty-one year old
participants to hypothetical decision-making problems concerning medical and
psychological treatment and noting no difference between the fourteen-year-old
youths and the adult groups and that even the nine-year old children were as
competent as the average adult according to the standards of choice and
reasonableness of choice); see generally, REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987).
77 William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive
Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 Am. Psychol. 895, 897-98 (1989).
78 See Scott et al., supra note 68, at 1060-61.
79 See Ellen Greenberg Garrison, Children's Competence to Participate in
Divorce Custody Decisionmaking, 20 J. Clinical Child Psychol. 78, 84 (1991).
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is remarkably different from and may be lacking for a child who
chooses between two parental caretakers. Any expressed
preference should not trump other considerations of the child's
best interests.
2. Weighing the Elements
To compound the problem that there is no perfect list of best
interest considerations,80 the relative weights or priorities of the
factors matter a great deal. As Katharine Bartlett has noted,
"When the factors [of the best interests rule] do not all point in a
single direction-that is, when guidelines are needed most-they
leave the decision maker to decide which factors matters most,
with no useful guidance from the rule itself."8' Thus, not only is
the factored best interests of the child test a non-test but also, as
the drafters of the AAML Proposed Model Relocation Act
concede, if the contestants are two competent, caring parents
who have had a healthy post-divorce relationship with the child,
the competing interests are properly labeled "compelling and
irreconcilable."8 2
The flaw at the core of the best interests test, with or
without explicit factor lists, is that the accurate prediction of
litigation outcome is only slightly better than forecasting the
weather.8 3 Furthermore, although courts purport to be focusing
80 The real contribution of the AAML Proposed Model Relocation Act is not in
its substantive criteria for resolving disputed relocations but in its process
requirements. See infra Part III.
81 Bartlett, supra note 59, at 473.
82 AAML Proposed Model Relocation Act, supra note 33, § 405 cmt.
83 Professor Wexler has suggested that any standard other than endangerment
of the child (or variations such as substantial harm or significant harm) may be
unconstitutional, noting the Supreme Court's famous aside in Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1997).
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[ilf the
State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of
the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole
reason that to do so was thought to be in their children's best interest."
Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Wexler notes that
once the initial custody decision has been reached, a new family unit exists and the
rights and obligations of both parents have shifted. Consequently, the state should
be precluded, even upon the request of the other parent, from intervening and re-
inquiring, absent some allegation of imminent risk for the child. Wexler, supra note
12, at 814-16.
Of course, the critical, unilluminated term in the Supreme Court's dicta is
"natural family." See Quiloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
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upon the child's interests vis-a-vis the parents' preferences, the
court does not review a proposed relocation unless one of the
parents objects. Thus, what is really happening is the court is
aligning itself with one parent's preference.
B. The Moving Parent's Lesser Burden: Good Faith
Some states have extracted from the cluster of factors
contained in subparagraphs (5)-(7) of the Model Relocation Act
those that are relevant to an assessment of the motivation of the
relocating parent and promoted this consideration as the
exclusive test for judicial ratification of the proposed change.
In these jurisdictions, if the relocating parent is found to be
motivated by good faith, then the court further inquires into the
effect of the proposed move upon the child, and the burden of
proving that the move is not in the child's best interests shifts to
the objecting parent.8 4 Conversely, if the relocating parent is
found to be acting vindictively to thwart access-that is, in bad
faith-then relocation is denied. This is a cognate of the
"friendly parent" criterion popularized in legislation in the
1980s, typically expressed as a requirement for the court to
consider "[tihe willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate
and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the
other parent and the child."85 There are numerous studies
indicating that a child's postdivorce adjustment is enhanced
when each parent supports and encourages the relationship with
the other and when the parents' relationship is civil, even if not
"friendly."8 6 Thus the motivation of the relocating parent is
surely relevant and might as well be justified, as some states
insist, as a prerequisite for court approval of the move.8 7
84 See, e.g., Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 682 (Conn. 1998) (determining
that, in Connecticut, when burden on the moving parent to prove good faith is met,
burden then shifts to non-relocating parent to show the move is not in best interest
of the child); Tomasko v. Dubuc, 761 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 2000) (applying
Connecticut's Ireland Rule); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175(3) (West 2001);
Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Neb. 1999) (noting that if the
relocating parent's motives are legitimate, the court should consider the motives of
each parent in proposing or resisting the move in its analysis of the child's best
interest).
85 OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(1)(f)(1998); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134
(West 2002) (expressing very similar language).
86 See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, 4 FUTURE OF
CHILD 121, 131-32 (1994).
87 In addition, some states like Maryland, though employing a best interests
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The central problem with such a doctrinal stance is that the
case law and statutes rarely cabin the good faith concept, leaving
open the possibility that reasonable judges may differ in their
evaluations. This standard, furthermore, is even more
amorphous than the ubiquitous "best interests" formulation and
is preoccupied with the parent's motivation rather than by a
holistic view of the impact of the move upon the child.
Dr. Judith Wallerstein, who is a clinical psychologist,
divorce expert,88 amica curiae, 89 and Oprah guru,90 includes on
her list of good motives: occupational, educational, or "other
opportunities that will enhance the quality of life of the
relocating child, as well as the parent."91 She also offers some
amplification of what is encompassed by bad faith: moves that
are "frivolous or advanced out of anger or a desire for revenge
that is calculated to prevent or substantially diminish a child's
contact with the other parent."92
Her listing encompasses the reasons for relocation that have
been reflected in reported litigation. Yet, as those cases
illustrate, distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable
reasons or even discerning the "real" underlying reason for a
proposed relocation is not a clear call. One clinician has noted
that some relocating parents may not themselves accurately
test, are heavily predisposed against relocation when there is evidence that the
parent previously denied visitation and was unwilling to foster a relationship
between the child and the other parent. See Braun v. Headley, 750 A.2d 624, 633-34
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
88 Wallerstein and her various co-authors have published many articles and
three books that followed a sample of divorcing families in California after their
divorce. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 71 (reporting a five-year study);
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN,
AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989) (discussing a ten-year study);
WALLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 71 (reporting a twenty-five year review).
89 Wallerstein co-authored an amica curiae brief that was filed for the
California Supreme Court's consideration of its most famous relocation case, In re
Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Brief of Amicus Curiae Tony J.
Janke & Judith S. Wallerstein, In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996);
see also Judith S Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move:
Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following
Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305 (1996) (recapitulating the brief).
90 Dr. Wallerstein appeared, on Dec. 29, 1999, on a show entitled "Divorce
Workshop for Children" and again, on Oct. 19, 2000, on "Divorce Workshop Follow-
Up," http://www.oprah.com/tows/pastshows/tows_2000/tows past-20001019c.jhtml.
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perceive why they desire to move. 93 Another clinician has
observed that the stated beneficial reason may obscure an
underlying pathology: a person can move to be with extended
family due to "pathological dependency on family members."
The moving parent may have "personality problems that
interfere with the parent's ability to adjust to a particular
environment, with the associated fantasy that change of location
will somehow result in more gratifying personal relationships." 94
The real reason can be masked; finding a better job may be
secondary to the parent's true intent of "diluting the strength of
the child's relationship with the other parent."95 Of course, like
all decisions, the motives of the moving parent may be mixed.
In addition to the difficulties of accurate characterization,
some trial lawyers point to the interactive quality of divorced
parents' behaviors in which cause, effect, and comparative
rectitude often blur: "In real life, these parents are in a custody
dispute. They're at war... . How do you determine who's more
at war than the other?"96 More troubling is the criticism that the
availability of the "friendliness" bonus deters some parents from
fully litigating the merits of the custody dispute. Legitimate
concerns can be pocketed for fear of appearing hostile or critical
of the other parent's worth.97
These concerns bring added unease when the motivation of
the moving parent is the pivotal issue used in the calculus to
resolve relocation. Though well intentioned, the good faith
standard is pockmarked by vagueness and the illusion of
accurate factfinding.
C. The New ALI Proposal Presumption Favoring Good Faith
Relocation
For initial custody determinations upon divorce, the reform
proposal of the American Law Institute (ALI) substitutes the
93 Herbert N. Weissman, Psychotherapeutic and Psycholegal Considerations:
When a Custodial Parent Seeks to Move Away, 22 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 176, 176-77
(1994).
94 Richard A. Gardner, The Burgess Decision and the Wallerstein Brief, 26 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIAT. L. 425,428 (1998).
95 Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children's Best Interests in
Relocation Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83, 103 (2000).
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best interests rule with the principle of approximation; that is,
the trial court is to attempt to preserve the relative pre-divorce
caretaking responsibilities of each parent and approximate that
time sharing ratio in post-divorce orders.98 The ALI reform
proposal also provides a multi-layered framework specifically
tailored for determining issues of relocation and adjustment of
access rights.99 Though the redactors do not use terms like "legal
custodian," "joint custody," or "presumptions", the proposal
operates remarkably like the California rule announced in In re
Marriage of Burgess100 If the legal custodian, the parent with
significant custodial responsibility, seeks to relocate, there is a
strong presumption favoring the move. In contrast, if the
parents have joint custody, then the wisdom of the move is
resolved by using the best interests of the child test.
As noted above, if the relocating parent is the one who has
been "exercising a significant majority of the custodial
responsibility" and he shows that the relocation is in good faith
and for a valid purpose," then the move should be allowed if to a
location that is "reasonable in light of the purpose."1 1 The model
gives some amplification about the meaning of good faith: a move
"for a legitimate purpose and to a location that is reasonable in
light of the purpose."10 2 The usual examples of reasons for the
move are prima facie legitimate, 10 3 and a less common purpose
98 See ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.08, at 354; Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism,
Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 630-43. (1992). The
ALI Reporter, Professor Katharine Bartlett, acknowledges that Scott's thesis served
as the basis for the proposed ALI model. See Bartlett, supra note 59, at 478 n.24.
See generally Robert F. Kelly & Shawn L. Ward, FAM. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2003)
(analyzing the approximation principle in light of social science research). In the
context of relocation, approximation is used only to revise the "parenting plan," the
terms and conditions of custody and access.
99 ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17, at 354.
100 913 P.2d 473, 478, 483 n.12 (Cal. 1996). The parent entitled to the legal
custody of the child has the authority to change the child's residence so long as the
move does not cause the child detriment. If the parents have joint physical custody,
a proposed move by one requires a de novo determination of custody. Id.
101 ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17(4)(a).
102 Id.
103 The listing of § 2.17(4)(a)(ii) explicitly recognizes six valid purposes: to be
close to support networks, to respond to significant health concerns, to protect the
safety of the child or household members from significant risk of harm, to pursue
significant employment or educational opportunity, or to be with one's spouse or
perhaps a spouse equivalent, or to improve quality of life. See supra text
accompanying notes 35-44 (noting the typical purposes that are reflected by
decisions).
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can be specially justified by the relocating parent. For any of
these justifications, the reasonableness of the move is presumed
unless the other parent shows that the same purpose could be
achieved, or is substantially achievable, by choosing a less
disruptive alternative. 10 4
Thus, so long as the proposal has a ring of reasonableness,
for example, displaying some investigation and sensible
judgment by the would-be moving parent, especially for a
categorical reason, there is no room for disputing the custodian's
good faith. A relatively strong case of a mother's attempt to
freeze the father out of a sustained relationship with his son,
similar to the case presented in Hentz v. Hentz,10 5 would be
decided differently if North Dakota applied the ALI model.
There the father's proof fell within the approximation principle
embraced by the ALI: during the divorce proceedings the mother
had unreasonably withheld contact between the father and their
young son. Finding that such misconduct had prognostic value
for her future behavior after her proposed move to Montana, the
North Dakota Supreme Court denied relocation.
The preclusion of claims that the relocating parent may be
acting maliciously, vengefully, or selfishly is a hidden cost to the
ALI proposal's limited concept of "good faith." Nevertheless, the
diminution of litigation about its meaning may be worth the
cost. 106
A slightly more complicated determination is the required
finding of whether an individual enjoys "the clear majority of
custodial responsibility." In the words of the Reporter:
Whether the custodial responsibility a parent has been
exercising constitutes a clear majority of custodial
responsibility is determined by a uniform rule of statewide
application. The amount set by such a rule should be sufficient
to identify those circumstances in which an impairment of the
relationship between the child and the parent having the most
custodial time with the child can be reasonably assumed to be
more detrimental to the child than the impairment of the
relationship between the child and the other parent. A simple
majority of 51% is not enough to trigger the substantial latitude
104 Id.
105 624 N.W.2d 694, 698 (N.D. 2001).
106 As argued in the next section, a better approach to redressing parental
acrimony and vengefulness may be through notice, education, and mediation rather
than by a substantive rule of custody. See infra Part IV.
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this section extends to the relocating parent. A percentage
between 60 and 70 percent falls within a reasonable threshold
range. 107
In other words, the ALI rule measures the strength of a
parent-child relationship and the consequent harm caused by its
disruption based exclusively on the length of time that the
parent and child have shared a home in the past. Unlike the
primary caretaker standard debated but rejected now by all
states, 05 the ALI proposal substitutes a flat time calculation for
the more traditional qualitative measures such as an assessment
of the caretaking duties each parent performed. A qualitative
evaluation of the respective parental roles in the child's life,
using the best interests standard, is appropriate only when
neither parent has acted as the child's primary or predominant
custodian. 109
The strength of this approach, like in states that employ a
presumption in favor of the child's custodian, is that it produces
more determinate results than does the dog-eared best interests
test. It recognizes that disruption and reallocation are inherent
in any proposed relocation and seeks to minimize the harm to
the nonmoving parent: "[Ilf practical, the court should revise the
parenting plan so as to both accommodate the relocation without
changing the proportion of custodial responsibility each parent is
exercising. " 110  In most relocations, "approximating" the
timeshares previously enjoyed will be impossible, at least in
terms of frequency, though the overall use percentage may be
preserved. It is like converting a one weekend per month time
share of a beach cottage into a one month per year arrangement.
So, too, the ALI proposal creates prima facie categories of
justified or "valid purposes" for a move, thus narrowing the
permissible scope of the other parent's challenge.
107 ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17, cmt. D, at 361.
108 West Virginia, which began the experiment with the primary caretaker rule
in Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362-63 (W. Va. 1981), has now adopted the
ALI approach. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-11-106 (Michie Supp. 2002). See
generally, David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes
in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984) (providing an overview of criticisms of the
primary caretaker rule, many of which apply with equal force to the approximation
principle).
109 ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17(4)(c).
110 Id. § 2.17(3).
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Any ALI proposal certainly carries considerable influence.
Furthermore, the relocation model does not stray far from
accepted principles. In other words, the concept of a quantitative
test for the identification of the primary caretaker has been used
sub silentio by jurisdictions for some time."' The ALI proposal
is simply more explicit and blunt. A drawback of the proposal is
that the level of past parental involvement with the child is not
necessarily a valid determining factor of the level of commitment
of either parent after relocation.112 Furthermore, the retention of
the best interests test offers only uncertainty and litigation for
those parents sharing similar portions of caretaking time.
D. The Objecting Parent's Burden: Relocation Endangers the
Child and Lacks Mitigating Benefits
Finally, the rule that is most narrowly drawn is that
proposed by the 1970 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(UMDA)." 3  The UMDA does not single out relocation as a
change of circumstances warranting the formulation of a special
rule, but instead, relocation decisions are governed by the
general principle enunciated in Section 409(b):
[T]he court shall retain the custodian appointed pursuant to
the prior decree unless... (3) the child's present environment
[or environment of proposed relocation] endangers seriously his
physical mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm
likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by
its advantages to him.114
In this formulation, the key word "environment"
encompasses both physical surroundings and legal arrangements
for custody. The presumption is similarly hidden: relocation is
permitted and presumed beneficial unless the custodian's
decision will endanger the child.
111 For example, Louisiana establishes a presumption for joint custody;
however, the domiciliary parent (the parent with whom the child primarily resides)
"shall have authority to make all decisions affecting the child unless an
implementation order provides otherwise." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335(B)(3)
(2000).
112 See generally Marion Gindes, The Psychological Effects of Relocation for
Children of Divorce, 1 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 119 (1998).
113 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 101-506, 9A U.L.A. 171-549 (1973).
114 Id. § 409(b). The first two exceptions discard situations in which the
custodian agrees to the modification or has acquiesced to a de facto change which is
now before the court.
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Colorado is an example of a state that has explicitly
extended the UMDA standard of endangerment to the child as a
basis for all modifications, including proposed relocation. 115 The
sturdiness of the Colorado rule favoring the custodial parent is
illustrated by In re Marriage of Steving,116 in which a proposed
move was affirmed even though there was evidence that the
custodian mother had undermined the father's relationship with
the child. More cautiously, Tennessee grants a "preference" to
the relocating primary domiciliary custodian. The objecting
parent nevertheless is limited to proof that the move is
vindictive, unreasonable, or poses a "threat of specific and
serious harm to the child." 117
One of the more intriguing contributions of the UMDA
standard, as applied by states to relocation, is the assumption
that the nonmoving parent could show that any move is at least
risky and may even constitute serious harm for the child, at least
over the short run, but that is not enough. Expert testimony that
the proposed relocation would inflict a second "loss" upon the
child, moving from extended family, friendship group, and
neighborhood does not go beyond the obvious. 118 For example,
Ohio quite properly requires a showing of actual harm that
"must transcend the normal and expected problems of
adjustment."119 A heavier burden of proof is required, and the
issue is refocused on taking a long-term view.
115 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-131(2) (2002); see In re Marriage of Francis,
919 P.2d 776, 778 (Colo. 1996). Modification is not authorized unless unanticipated
changes have occurred since the original decree and "[t]he retention of decision-
making responsibility would endanger the child's physical health or significantly
impair... the child's emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a
change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of the change to the child."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-131(2)(c); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.340 (Michie
Supp. 2002); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/610 (West 1999); Abbott v. Abbott, 25
P.3d 291, 293-94 (Okla. 2001).
116 980 P.2d 540 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
117 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108(d) (2001); see Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623,
629-30 (Tenn. 1996). Abby v. Strange is superceded by statute as stated in Elder v.
Elder, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Ohio also appears to
accord a presumption for relocation by the custodian, with rebuttal limited to a
showing of actual harm to the child that transcends the ordinary problems of
adjustment. See Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh, 737 N.E.2d 551, 554-55 (Ohio Ct. App.
2000).
118 See, e.g., Hickmon v. Hickmon, 19 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000).
119 Rohrbaugh, 737 N.E.2d at 556.
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The UMDA model's proof of benefit may be criticized
because it is limited to a proof of benefit to the child. There is
now a considerable body of social science literature that would
indicate that the benefit inquiry is more properly extended to
encompass the members of the child's custodial family as well.
Beginning with an influential New Jersey case, D'Onofrio v.
D'Onofrio,120 several states have recognized what is termed a
"unity of interests" between the child and primary custodian. 121
As the Massachusetts Court of Appeals explained, the
consideration of relocation requests must be grounded on the
realization that after a divorce there are two new family units:
The new family unit consists only of the children and the
custodial parent, and what is advantageous to that unit as a
whole, to each of its members individually and to the way they
relate to each other and function together is obviously in the
best interests of the children. It is in the context of what is best
for that family unit that the precise nature and terms of
visitation and changes in visitation by the noncustodial parent
must be considered. 122
The unity of interests concept actually mirrors prevailing
social theory much better than the best interests of the child
notion. Beginning in the 1960s, clinical psychology and
psychiatry shifted to family systems theory.1 23  Instead of
focusing exclusively on the patient, as is true for the medical
model, which calls for the examination, diagnosis, and treatment
of the pathology solely in the individual, therapists broadened
their analysis to note interactions and relationships between the
patient and family members. Family systems theory, though
immensely complex, posits understanding of needs and
120 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), af/'d per curiam, 365 A.2d
716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). The D'Onofrio opinion is also the source of the
early doctrine that the relocating parent had the burden of proving "actual
advantage" from a proposed move.
121 Freidrich v. Bevis, 9 S.W.3d 556, 558 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000); Zoccole v. Zoccole,
751 A.2d 248, 252 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). Cf Cloutier v. Queen, 545 S.E.2d 574 (Va.
Ct. App. 2001).
122 Hale v. Hale, 429 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). For a more recent
opinion, see Rosenthal v. Maney, 745 N.E.2d 350, 358 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001), writ
denied, 752 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 2001).
123 The term, which came into use in the late 1960s, grew out of Bowen's study
of relationship patterns in families with schizophrenia in 1950s and 1960s. See
generally MURRAY BOWEN, FAMILY THERAPY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (1978) (a
definitive sourcebook for the family systems theory); DANIEL V. PAPERO, BOWEN
FAMILY SYSTEMS THEORY (1990).
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behaviors of any individual on the emotional dynamics of the
family system. As the needs and behaviors of one member
change, others in the family system are invariably affected. 124
The four rules that dominate American relocation law span
the spectrum from the open and indeterminate to the best
interest of the child inquiry to the narrow consideration of
whether the move will create substantial harm to the child above
that caused by adjusting to a new area. None of the rules is a
perfect solution to the relocation problem. Which is the least
worst alternative for most children and families?
III. THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE' 25 RULE
A. Reducing Litigation: Isolating the Risk
As will be discussed in greater detail later, the major risk of
harm to the child in a relocation dispute is the loss or significant
dilution of a parental relationship. That is the risk that should
be taken into account in any substantive rule aimed at
protecting the child. It is not the destabilization that is common
to any move or the child's predictable hostility to environmental
dislocation, though both elements certainly cloud the dispute.
Post-divorce relocation has not been as intensively studied as
divorce, but at least on first learning of the possibility, a child's
views about relocation are quite predictable. Children at rest
tend to like to remain at rest in the comfort of familiar
surroundings and family relationships. Change is unsettling,
literally and psychologically. For example, a relocating parent
can predict that school age children will oppose any relocation
and perhaps become adamant if their resistance is encouraged
by the other parent. Older adolescents clearly have the power to
sabotage any move, if they fail to re-acclimate to a new
community and social group.126
124 See generally Wayne Regina, Bowen Systems Theory and Mediation, 18
MEDIATION Q. 111 (2000) (providing an intriguing analysis of family systems theory
as a basis for mediation of disputes); see infra text accompanying notes 185-194.
125 Reflecting the impossibility of finding any perfect rule, Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit coined this characterization of modem custody rules. See GOLDSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 28.
126 See Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and
the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POLy REV. 168 (1984) (justifying the exclusion
of older children from the primary caretaker rule).
[O]nce a child reaches the age of 14, [West Virginia] permit[s] the child to
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The data from national studies 127 reveal that not all non-
custodians remain actively engaged in relationships with their
children. From a national sample taken in 1987-88, nearly
thirty percent of relocated children had not seen the
noncustodial parent at all during the past year, and nearly sixty
percent had contact "several times or less." Only about twenty-
five percent saw their noncustodial parent weekly.128
Furthermore, earlier samples showed even less contact between
the noncustodial parent and their children.129  If the
noncustodial parent is not actively pursuing a relationship with
the child, it is difficult to see why the custodial parent's decision
about residence and family welfare ought not be free from all but
the most serious allegations that the child would suffer
substantial harm if the relocation were not enjoined. By
focusing upon a parent's actual exercise of parental
responsibilities, the ALI principles certainly suggest agreement
with this principle, although not as clearly as one might hope. 130
Consequently, in families in which there is only an inchoate
relationship between a child and the noncustodial parent, the
parent ought to be able to relocate, subject only to an extremely
name his or her guardian if both parents are fit. Often, as might be
expected, this means that the parent who makes the child's life more
comfortable will get custody; there is little alternative, however, since
children over fourteen who are living where they do not want to live will
become unhappy and ungovernable anyway.
Id. at 182.
127 See Judith A. Seltzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Who Live
Apart: The Father's Role After Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 79, 82-83 (1991)
(discussing data from the National Survey of Families and Households, 1987-88).
The full nation-wide sample included 13,017 respondents. Seltzer's subsample used
1,350 cases of mothers in households with minor children, separated from the
fathers. Id.
128 Id. at 85.
129 See Frank Furstenberg et al., The Life Course of Children of Divorce:
Marital Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 656 (1983). Only 17% of
the children enjoyed contact at least once a week with their fathers. Id. at 663.
130 ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17(1) ("The relocation of a parent
constitutes a substantial change in circumstances under § 2.15(1) only when the
relocation significantly impairs either parent's ability to exercise responsibilities
that the parent has been exercising or attempting to exercise under the parenting
plan.").
The Reporter's Comments underscore the requirement that actual exercise
ought to be the key rather than whatever amount of access was established by an
earlier judgment: "A parent may not establish substantially changed circumstances
on the basis of a prior allocation of custodial responsibility [that] the parent has not
actually been exercising or attempting to exercise." Id. cmt. b. at 343.
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strong showing by the other, inactive parent of substantial harm
to the child from the relocation. In this instance, the parent
objecting to the relocation would be required to carry the burden
of proof to halt the move, perhaps even by clear and convincing
evidence.
B. Reducing Litigation: Minimizing Harm to the Child
For the smaller pool of controversies that remain and cannot
be settled by the parents, the least detrimental substantive rule
is determined using two principal criteria: first, which rule
encourages negotiation and discourages litigation, and second,
which rule diminishes the five major stressors for children of
separated parents? There is no perfect rule. Nonetheless, the
choice is unavoidable and the social goal for deciding all issues of
child custody, including relocation of the child, should be aimed
at optimizing the potential for future collaborative parenting.
The state and its trial courts have both the authority and
responsibility to assist the members of the former unitary family
in their transition to successful parenting partnerships in a
binuclear family. 131  As the Washington Supreme Court
acknowledged,
[Tihe practical result of a marriage dissolution is that
parenting and family life will not be the same after dissolution.
This is so even though a trial court may believe it is in the "best
interests of the child" to continue to live in the same family
unit. A child cannot escape the reality that his or her family is
no longer the same. The trial court does not have the
responsibility or the authority or the ability to create ideal
circumstances for the family. 132
The five sources of stress that expose children of divorced
parents to the greatest amount of psychological risk are all
potentially present when relocation is contested: continued
conflict and hostility between the parents, a decline in economic
131 Ahrons uses the term "binuclear family" to describe the mitotic effect of
divorce. See generally CONSTANCE AHRONS, THE GOOD DIVORCE: KEEPING YOUR
FAMILY TOGETHER WHEN YOUR MARRIAGE COMES APART (1995). In the two
households, the child may interact as a family member with grandparents and other
members of her extended biological families as well as new stepparents,
stepsiblings, step-grandparents, and half-siblings.
132 In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362, 1371 (Wash. 1997). This case is
superceded by statute. See In re Marriage of Grigsby, 57 P.3d 1166 (Wash. 2002).
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circumstances, 133 fear of abandonment by one or both parents,
the diminished capacity of one or both parents to respond to the
child's needs, and diminished contact with familiar sources of
psychosocial support and familiar living settings. 34 A sixth
stressor, the remarriage of the relocating parent, often
accompanies the move. 135 Although social scientists disagree
about the relative importance of these risk factors, 136 there is a
consensus within the scientific community that these factors
ought to be the major concerns in fashioning any child custody
policy. 137
The overwhelming demonstration of child harm due to
parental hostility justifies its being treated as the most
dangerous risk to the child and the binuclear family.138 Divorce
133 Although the custodian mother can increase family means upon relocation, a
lower standard of living is clearly experienced by many mothers who are custodians
of children. Many researchers have listed this consideration as a significant
predictor of risk of children's post-divorce maladjustment. See Wallerstein & Tanke,
supra note 89, at 310; see also Michael E. Lamb et al., The Effects of Divorce and
Custody Arrangements on Children's Behavior, Development, and Adjustment, 35
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 393, 394-95 (1997). This article is especially
persuasive since it reflects the consensus of conclusion reached by a distinguished
group of American experts from the fields of developmental and clinical psychology,
sociology, social work, and law. In a previous meta-analysis of extant research,
Booth and Amato found that it was not a primary determinant of negative impact of
divorce upon children. See Alan Booth & Paul Amato, Divorce, Residential Change,
and Stress, 18 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 205 (1992).
134 See Lamb et al., supra note 133, at 395.
135 See, Lamb et al., supra note 133, at 103 (noting the need for further
research).
136 Compare Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 89, at 310-11 (emphasizing
research that the preeminent predictor for children's well-being was the well-being
of the custodial parent), with Warshak, supra note 95, at 89-95 (emphasizing
research finding that maintaining a strong relationship with the noncustodial
parent was critical to children's post-divorce adjustment).
137 See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES:
WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART (1991); Paul Amato, Children's
Adjustment to Divorce: Theories, Hypothesis, and Empirical Support, 55 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 23 (1993).
138 In a widely cited early study comparing the effects of conflict in both intact
and divorced families, it was shown that children were dramatically affected by the
hostility in which they were enmeshed. Children from high-conflict intact families
exhibited lower self-esteem and experienced greater maladjustments than those in
divorced families or from low-conflict intact families. See E. Mavis Hetherington et
al., Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES:
PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233-288 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1982). See
generally Janet R. Johnson, High Conflict Divorce, 4 THE FUTURE OF THE CHILDREN
165, 176 (1994). It is possible that litigation may be cathartic. See Wexler, supra
note 12, at 791-92. Litigation may offer a safer, healthier battlefield than self-help
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is not per se harmful for children; it is not the structure of a
child's family that causes the harm, but continuing and often
escalating conflict between the separated parents. The Schwartz
war, 39 which was waged in Nevada, a jurisdiction that
apparently still requires a relocating custodian to prove both
actual advantage from the move and that the move is in the best
interests of the child, is an illustration. The trial court noted
thirty-five different court appearances by the parents and
"expressed dismay that the parents were 'ambushing' each other
through the courts 'without really beginning to realize the
detrimental effect on the children.'-"140
Considerable evidence now exists that children living in
conflicting two-parent families are worse adjusted than children
living in well-functioning, single-parent families.' 4 ' Conflicts
between the parents, each claiming to be better than the other,
can turn into crippling loyalty competitions, at least as the child
perceives the tension in a typical egocentric manner.
Wallerstein and Kelly summarized the study of families five
years after divorce:
Often the conflict is exacerbated by parents and, indeed, two-
thirds of the parents openly competed for the children's love
and allegiance ..... School age children particularly appeared
to conceptualize the divorce as a struggle in which each
participant demanded one's primary loyalty, and this
conception greatly increased the conflict and unhappiness of
the child.' 42
These data counsel that the choice of substantive rule ought
to be one that minimizes the possibility of toxic litigation. Thus,
we should prefer rules that create greater certainty through the
use of presumptions and narrow windows of rebuttal.
The prospect of diminished contact with an extended
psychosocial network and loss of a familiar environment
certainly seems to weigh heavily in favor of a rule disfavoring
relocation. Children are typically risk-averse and will be wary of
any change. 143 Despite the complexity of this risk assessment,
for the adults, but I know of no data that suggest it makes the child better off.
139 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 812 P.2d 1268 (Nev. 1991).
140 Id. at 1273 n.8.
141 See Hetherington et al., supra note 138, at 233-85.
142 WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 71, at 49.
143 See supra text accompany notes 68-80 (discussing the preferences of
children).
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relocation studies have found that environmental readjustment
causes stress, but researchers have concluded that there were no
long-term negative effects for children, at least those in intact
families. 144 The opportunities presented by the move and family
members' attitudes about it, however, confound attempts to
assess the impact upon children and reduce any confidence that
a presumption disfavoring relocation is per se warranted.
In contrast, decline in economic circumstances is a risk that
presumably will be resolved by a presumption favoring
relocation. The custodial parent's risk assessment typically
leads to the conclusion that relocation will enhance their own as
well as their children's lives. This enhancement usually takes
the form of an economic benefit either reducing expenses due to
a connection with another support network or by an increase in
economic wealth.
The other considerations do not clearly incline the balance
either way. Fear of abandonment by the non-relocating parent
and diminished caretaking capacity of the would-be relocating
parent appear to cancel each other out. In the relocation context,
concern arises about the impairment of the child's relationship
with the non-relocating parent; however, if relocation is denied,
the would-be moving parent would perceive a lost opportunity
that might diminish his capacity to respond to the child's needs.
Experts have weighed in on both sides of this debate. Some,
such as Wallerstein, 145 rely on clinical findings and empirical
research documenting the benefit to the child of supporting the
primary caretaker's autonomy, including available opportunities
and the benefits from family unity. Others, including Lamb,146
point to research that finds significant enhancement of children's
well-being based on a number of psychosocial measures when the
nonresidential parent is actively engaged in caring for their
children by planning and participating in their everyday lives.
The carefully worded conclusion of both of the most
14 See, e.g., Gindes, supra note 112, at 126-27. Gindes also notes that there are
no long-term studies that have specifically examined the impact of relocation by
only the residential parent and child away from the home community and from the
other parent. Id.
145 See, e.g., Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 89.
146 See generally Michael E. Lamb, Non-Custodial Fathers and Their Children,
in HANDBOOK OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT (E. C. Tamis-Lemonda & N. Cabrera eds.)
(in press).
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methodologically sound recent studies 147 is that more frequent
contact between a noncustodial parent and child produces better
psychosocial adjustments for the children, as long as inter-
parent conflict is not significant. That finding would certainly
seem to support a rule denying or diminishing the likelihood of
relocation. Research has also documented that, if there is high
conflict between the parents, the greater the frequency of contact
between the noncustodial parent and the child, the less well
children fare.148  Consequently, the wild cards are the
intransigence of the would-be relocating parent. It is their
opportunity to cast the costs of any denial of opportunity upon
the other parent and the child, and paradoxically, any legal rule
that would invite litigation of their competing claims.
The empirical data do not clearly point the way to a rule
choice between denying the benefits of relocation to the child's
primary caretaker-and possibly to the child-or denying
continuation of the child's present significant relationship with
the non-relocating parent. On balance, the best solution is to
optimize the possibility of the parents themselves negotiating an
agreement, rather than resorting to litigation and conflict.
Specifically, the optimal rule induces the relocating parent to
respond to the needs of the child and the other parent to remain
in a renovated, but equally vital, relationship after relocation.
Upon an objection filed by the noncustodial parent, the would-be
relocating parent must carry a three-fold burden of proof: that
counseling and mediation have been attempted in good faith but
failed; that the relocating parent has provided a reasonable plan
for ensuring and supporting the child's continuing relationship
with the other parent, including the sharing of contact costs; and
that the direct benefits for the child outweigh the particular
harm from the loss of significant, frequent contact enjoyed by the
147 The Stanford Divorce Study is reported in a variety of sources. See C. M.
Buchanan et al., Caught Between Parents: Adolescents' Experience in Divorced
Homes, 62 CHILD DEV. 1008 (1991); ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN,
DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992). The
findings of the National Survey of Families and Households are also available in
various sources. See Paul R. Amato & Sandra J. Rezac, Contact with Nonresident
Parents, Interparental Conflict, and Children's Behavior, 15 J. FAM. ISSUES 191
(1994).
148 See J. R. Johnston et al., Ongoing Post-Divorce Conflict in Families
Contesting Custody: Do Joint Custody and Frequent Access Help? 59 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCH. 576, 576-78. (1989).
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child and the other parent. Placing the burden of proof upon the
relocating parent-creating a mild presumption against
relocation-seems necessary to induce the dislocating parent to
negotiate and to offer sufficient inducements for remodeling the
other parent-child relationship.
The question of the amount of impact that a choice of
relocation rule would have upon the parent's negotiations and
the child's well-being must be addressed because the
overwhelming majority of child custody matters are resolved by
parental agreement, usually negotiated by lawyers. As Mnookin
and Kornhauser proved in their classic article, the substantive
rule of law provides the context for private ordering and frames
the types and range of bargaining costs. 149 At negotiation, the
only tangible benefits to be distributed are time with the child
and the expenses of contact and transportation between
households. With the institution of mandatory child support
guidelines in every state150 and the enactment of the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act, 151 which greatly facilitates the
collection of support when the parents live in different states,
opting to exchange money for time becomes considerably less
likely.152
149 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhouser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951(1979); see also Scott, supra note
98, at 643-56 (discussing the interaction between bargaining theory and custody
rules). Adoption of any relocation rule will also affect the parties' bargaining at the
time of the divorce and initial resolution of the child custody issue. I can see no
reason why a custodial parent might not then bind himself not to relocate in
exchange for some other equally valuable gain. If in the future he changes his mind
and desires to move, he would need to negotiate for the other parent's release or
attempt to gain the court's approval for the proposed breach of contract.
150 42 U.S.C. § 667 (2000). The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services are found in 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (1993). Of course, there
are worrisome data that suggest that the amount and frequency of contact between
nonresidential parents and their children may affect payment of child support thus,
at a minimum increasing enforcement costs. See Lamb et al., supra note 133, at 397
(concluding there is a "clear association" between the two); see also Warshak, supra
note 95, at 94 n.48. However, Wallerstein and Kelly found no correlation between
regular contact and full support. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 71, at 373-74.
151 9 U.L.A. 121 if. (Supp. 1994). This Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is
now adopted by all states.
152 Though most child support guidelines permit the parties to settle outside
them, there is a presumption that the designated amount is "the proper amount of
child support." See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:315.1-9:315.47 (West 2000)
(income shares model). The court must approve any stipulated deviation. See id.
§ 9:315.1(D). Because the range of acceptable payments based upon both parents'
income is fixed, the court should be more likely to realize a deviation than was true
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Relocation unleashes a set of perverse incentives. A rule
favoring relocation enables the moving parent to capture all the
benefits from the move as well as to externalize a significant
fraction of the costs upon the nonmoving parent by failing to
take into account her needs for a vibrant, continuing relationship
with the child. A relocating parent may be tempted to move to
impose new costs upon a loathed ex-spouse. Similarly, a rule
that disfavors relocation creates a veto power for the nonmoving
parent and a well-known incentive to hold out for a share of the
mover's gains. Thus, the nonmoving parent is tempted to
strategically contest relocation. Neither rule properly aligns the
parents' incentives. Either way, a perverse incentive will arise.
One encourages inefficient moves; the other discourages efficient
moves that may make both parents and the child better off.153
With non-market commodities like the satisfactions of
parenthood and the quality and quantity of parent-child
association, what enables us to quantify the family's gains and
losses when relocation is proposed? The inability to make a
rational choice between relocation presumptions, as economic
theory would put it, compels us to seek a process that encourages
the parents to resolve the cluster of relocation issues for
themselves. Only when the decision to relocate is agreed to
jointly by both parties can we have any assurance that the
correct, non-perverse decision has been made. Accordingly, the
focus of the law must be shifted from framing the choice in terms
of presumptions of entitlement toward creating a process that
will enhance the likelihood that such consensual resolutions will
often result.
Negotiation between uncoupling parents about the terms of
the new post-relocation parental partnership should also be
encouraged because the child's future well-being depends upon
the parents' ability to resolve their differences without litigation,
in pre-guidelines practice and, if the proposal is to significantly reduce the higher
income earner's obligation, then the court should also be more likely to disapprove
the proposed settlement. See Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously:
Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687, 722-23 (1985)
(noting the difficulties in assessing the fairness of parents' bargaining for support in
exchange for access time).
153 A problem of this sort has only recently been recognized as intractable when
attempting to sort out which party should be granted rights. See generally Richard
A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to
Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553 (1993).
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self-help, or other forms of warfare. Parental collaboration is in
the best interests of the child. The process the state employs in
the course of resolving child custody relocation disputes is
equally as important and potentially more beneficial, to the child
than the formulation of an adjudicative rule. We now shift the
assessment of the child's interests from a substantive
paradigm-attempting to evaluate whether granting or denying
relocation will benefit the child more-to a process paradigm
asking what parental decision-making relationship will most
benefit the child now and in the future.
IV. THE PROCESS OF RELOCATION RESOLUTION
A. The Process of Separation and Divorce
Every observer of the modern American contested custody
lawsuit has decried the expense of battle, the escalation of
viciousness, and the war prize of life-long bitterness, even
likening it to Armageddon. 54 Despite the terrible losses, nothing
seems to change. Just recently, a New York trial court heard ten
days of testimony in a relocation case, including three expert
evaluators and several hundred pages of exhibits. 155 The four-
year old child was "so pulled by the trauma of this contested
matrimonial action," reported the court, that "she recently asked
her mother, 'Who has me today Mommy?'"156 Furthermore, as
Andrew Schepard has observed, there are more subtle costs that
often go unreported and unnoticed:
The adversarial process wreaks havoc on many other aspects of
the reorganization of a child's life after divorce. In addition to
creating conflict in the nuclear family, it also destroys other
infrastructures of the child's life such as bonds with relatives.
The custody battle often pits two opposing camps in which
grandparents, uncles, and aunts actively take sides to enter the
fray. Furthermore, the turmoil associated with the custody
fight provides a bad model for future behavior for the child.
The child learns that a person must turn to an outsider to
resolve disputes; a lesson diametrically opposed to the one
164 See generally Andrew S. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of
Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969).
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learned from the marriage model. 157
By assuming the authority and responsibility for regulating
marriage and family relationships 158 and claiming the sole
authority to dissolve them,159 the state has a responsibility to
minimize harm to any child and to assist the parents in
reorganizing their lifetime roles as the child's caretakers. One of
the most impressive features of the ALI Proposal is that it
acknowledges this public obligation and underscores the need for
parent counseling and education. 160 Obviously, there are limits
to the impact any law or rule can have on human behavior.161
Short of denying divorce or denying relocation, however, the
state can induce good parenting, at least marginally, through
rules that infringe less upon fundamental liberties. 62 It is a
very strange feature of modern American law that public debate
usually centers around liberalizing or restricting divorce; it
rarely considers how divorce might be made better and less
burdensome for children if it cannot be avoided. While the state
intervenes to protect abused and neglected children in the name
of parens patriae, the state has not traditionally intervened in a
divorce to provide similar protection for the children's future
lives.
The state, having the ability to assist in its families' status
transition, ought to shoulder that responsibility. There are now
considerable data demonstrating the terrible costs of the
traditional laissez-faire social policy toward divorcing parents
and the benefits that might be derived from providing assistance
to them. It is estimated that one-fourth to one-third of divorcing
parents have considerable difficulty regaining their footing after
separation and perhaps one in ten clearly fail to adjust.163 The
inability to work through the anger, disappointment, and fear of
157 Schepard, supra note 152, at 738-739.
158 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190 (1888).
159 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
160 See ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.07 at 165-71.
161 See Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE RULE OF LAW
171, 212 (R. P. Wolff ed., 1971); Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and
Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 77-81 (1987).
162 See Scott, supra note 98, at 668-69. Scott might agree that as long as the
law encouraged rather than ordered parental behaviors, reformation (vis-a-vis
transformation) might be achieved.
163 See Lamb et al., supra note 133, at 396.
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divorce leaves some of this group embittered and actively hostile
for many years. This places their children at a much higher risk
of psychosocial problems. These high-conflict parents and
couples are identified by multiple characteristics: high rates of
litigation and re-litigation, high degrees of anger and distrust,
intermittent verbal or physical aggression, difficulty focusing on
their children's needs as distinct from their own, and chronic
difficulty co-parenting and communicating about their children
after divorce. 164 Conflict carries a substantial social price tag.
For those who do adjust to establish well enough to establish
the necessary new patterns of co-parenting in binuclear families
and interact as a "single head of household" with other adults,
the transition may be unnecessarily difficult and long. Social
scientists have cautioned that legal divorce-the signing of
orders freeing parties to remarry and settling issues of property,
support, and custody-is but one stage in psychological
divorce, 165  a unique human experience. 166  During that
transition, the family members are at risk:
The immediate impact of divorce is to increase stress and
distress.... [Sitressed or depressed [caretakers] were most
likely to have disrupted practices and consequently their
children would exhibit antisocial behaviors, which would then
act as a feedback loop. That is, the poor parental discipline
would generate child behavioral problems, which would
increase parental stress and depression and perpetuate
ineffective parenting.167
The state's role in divorce may more appropriately
acknowledge that process by assisting the parents and child
through at least the earliest stage and preparing them for what
lays ahead: the typical two to six year transition from marriage
164 Id.
165 Constance R. Ahrons, Redefining the Divorced Family: A Conceptual
Framework, 25 SOC. WORK 437, 437-39 (1980); E. Mavis Hetherington, Divorce: A
Child's Perspective, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 851, 851-52 (1979); WALLERSTEIN &
KELLY, supra note 71, at 303. More recently, some social scientists have disputed
the claim that a divorce follows an orderly pattern through successive stages,
proposing instead a cycling effect among emotions. See R. E. EMERY,
RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND
MEDIATION 15 (1994).
166 See generally Shelley V. Brown, Till Death Do Us Part, 58 EMORY MAG. 23
(Oct. 1981); See generally Gindes, supra note 112; Hetherington et al., supra note
138; WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 71.
167 Gindes, supra note 112, at 142.
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to living single. 168 Everyone benefits when a former unitary
family can successfully transition to a binuclear family. When
conflict is reduced and modification and enforcement costs are
minimized, benefits flow to members of the new families, to
society at large, and to the children and their future families.
Specifically, the state should recognize the obligation to provide
three types of services to divorcing families: conciliation and
counseling services, parenting education, and mediation. These
services can be provided though efforts to restructure the process
of post-divorce proceedings.
Even if these services are not generally available to all
divorcing parents, parenting education and mediation are at no
point more critical than in a relocation dispute, with its winner-
take-all consequence. 169 As social scientists have cautioned:
The cooperative interaction of the parents is critical to the
child's healthy development and peace of mind. The high
potential for continued or re-opened conflict, as in the
relocation issue, can severely threaten the child's sense of
security, confirming a view of the world as an armed camp in
which the child can trust no one.170
The state should mandate and provide education to all
divorcing parents about long distance separation and
collaborative parenting. Using relocation as the focus, it should
mandate mediation in order to arrange new parenting
responsibilities and, more importantly, to teach parents how to
accommodate inevitable change and renegotiate parenting
arrangements in the future. The state should also begin this
process by modeling good parenting in its relocation process,
beginning with a statutory notice provision.
168 See Hetherington et al., supra note 138, at 75 (finding that most divorce
effects had subsided by eighteen months post-divorce); WALLERSTEIN & KELLY.,
supra note 71, at 189-194 (finding considerable restabilization after five years but
even after twenty-five years, some persistent effects). Cf E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON
& JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR WORSE (2002) (noting that based on her thirty-year
study of families, 70% of the adult divorcees are doing well after two years). See
generally WALLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 73.
169 Relocation probably spells the end to hopes for reconciliation, though it
should be explored if counseling services are made available. Many parent divorce
education programs urge counseling as a helpful extension of support for those
parents who need more than information.
170 Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 89, at 311 (citations omitted).
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B. Notice of Relocation and Proposed Accommodation
Moving without notice creates stress, even alarm, about the
child's whereabouts; it engenders distrust and surely an
"inflammatory reaction" in most left-behind
parents.17'Disappearance is like the flinging of a gauntlet that
can goad even a passive parent into an expensive and deadly
duel.172 If the children have been drawn into a surprise move,
they are forced to be allies in a conspiracy against the other
parent, with attendant feelings of guilt and shame about their
duplicity.
Thus, states should require that a relocating parent give
notice before moving. A parent who seeks to protect a child
would give notice, and the law should be structured to encourage
this behavior. The ALI and AAML proposals 173 and a few
American statutes require that the relocating parent inform the
noncustodial parent of an impending move in writing and
provide the new address where the child will be residing if that
information is available. 17 4 The time periods within which notice
must be given vary from thirty days to sixty days before the
relocation. 175 Some moves, like employment opportunities, can
occur within shorter time periods, and typically there is a proviso
for "the most notice practicable under the circumstances.' 7 6 The
usual exception suspends the notice requirement if there is a
credible threat of domestic violence if the family's new residence
is disclosed.177
171 Richard M. Bryan, Beyond Burgess: One Year Later, 20 FAM. ADVOC. 14, 17
(1997).
172 See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 58 S.W.3d 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
173 ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17(2); AAML Proposed Model Relocation
Act, supra note 33, §§ 1-5.
174 This right to information requirement parallels the statutory revision
movement in 1980s that explicitly recognized the right of a noncustodial parent to
access the child's medical and school records. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-717(A)
(Michie 1983); LA REV. STAT. § 9:351 (West 2001).
175 For example, California requires at least 45 days notice before any change in
residence. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3024 (Deering 1994). The AAML Proposed Model
Relocation Act, as enacted in Louisiana, requires 60 days notice of any move that is
more than 150 miles from the other parent. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.4(1) (West
1998).
176 ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17(2). It requires 60 days notice or "the
earliest notice practicable under the circumstances."
177 See ALA. CODE § 30-3-132(b) (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(9)(C)
(1999); ALI Proposal, supra note 30, § 2.17 cmt. c at 359-60. See generally Janet M.
Bowermaster, Relocation Custody Disputes Involving Domestic Violence, 46 U. KAN.
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Requiring the parent to file a "damage limitation"'78 focuses
the mind on what lies ahead and the core issues of mitigating
the child's fears about abandonment by the other parent and the
disruption of their routines and support network. This
requirement provides a demonstration of good faith by the
relocating parent and is an invitation to negotiate with the
purpose of sustaining a relationship acknowledged as important
for the child's well-being. It also may be an opportunity to
discuss the reallocation of support obligations between the
parents. Certainly, less support can be a powerful bargaining
chip to induce the nonmoving parent to acquiesce without
expensive litigation. 179
More importantly, the provision of notice should also call for
a proposal for revised access arrangements in view of the
relocation. This is a deceptively simple requirement. Casting the
burden for a proposal for adjustment upon the relocating parent
symbolizes her responsibility to mitigate the psychological and
financial costs for the other parent and the child and the impact
upon their relationship that is due to her decision. It focuses the
minds of both parents on the future, rather than the past, and
sets the stage for renegotiation of the terms of shared parenting.
The relocating parent bears responsibility for the change and for
attempting to mitigate the psychological and financial costs for
the other parent. Although the frequency of access will be
diminished in most moves of significant distance, total parenting
time need not be. Furthermore, the quality of the parent-child
relationship can remain constant, if not be enhanced. 80 Longer
stays, to compensate for less frequent ones, enable a
noncustodial parent to replicate the parenting rhythms of an
intact family:
To maintain high quality relationships with their children,
L. REV. 433 (1998).
178 See supra text accompanying note 2.
179 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 149, at 959-63. Among others, Scott
discusses this opportunistic behavior at some length. See Scott, supra note 98, at
649-56. It should also be noted that under income-sharing child support statutes,
an increase in the custodian's financial well-being that is achieved by relocation can
justify a decrease in the other parent's financial obligation. See supra note 151.
180 See, e.g., Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727, 737-38, 665 N.E.2d 145, 149-50,
642 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579-80 (1996); D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), affd per curiam, 365 A.2d 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976).
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parents need to have sufficiently extensive and regular
interaction with them, but the amount of time involved is
usually less important than the quality of the interaction it
fosters. Time distribution arrangements that ensure the
involvement of both parents in important aspects of their
children's everyday lives and routines-including bedtime and
waking rituals, transitions to and from school, extracurricular
and recreational activities-are likely to keep nonresidential
parents playing psychologically important and central roles in
the lives of their children.181
There is now a consensus among social scientists that it is
the quality of the noncustodial parent-child interaction, rather
that the quantity of days of companionship, that is important in
their bonding.3 2
Furthermore, new wave web technology offers innovative
contact possibilities for making sight and sound access possible
on a daily basis. A New Jersey appellate court recently
remanded a relocation case for the trial court to reconsider the
benefits of Internet visitation to supplement opportunities for
physical access.' 8 3
C. Education About Parenting After Relocation
Social scientists have gathered a great deal of data about
what children need and want during and after their parents'
divorce. With that knowledge, both parents may be enabled to
anticipate and minimize their children's anxiety and devise a
common approach for dealing with their children's distress.
As of 2001, twenty-eight states have state-wide divorce
education programs for divorcing parents, and at least seven
other states have various pilot programs in selected
181 Lamb et al., supra note 133, at 400.
182 See Paul R. Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Children's
Well-Being: A Meta-Analysis, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557 (1999). Summarizing 67
studies, they found that the quality of the father-child interaction was more
important than the frequency of contact. Id.; see also FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN,
supra note 137, at 72. Warshak agrees in principle, although he cites studies finding
a correlation between children's success and stronger father-child relationships.
Warshak, supra note 95, at 92.
183 McCoy v. McCoy, 764 A.2d 449 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). Cf Kime v.
Kime, No. 40472(U), 2001 WL 1665824 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County Sept. 28, 2001)
(rejecting the argument that letter, fax, or e-mail communications could substitute
effectively for physical presence); see also 1996 ABA Family Law Section Annual
Meeting Compendium, 10+ Easy Ways a Long-Distance Parent Can Stay in Touch,
at 183-85, in 20 FAM. ADVOC. 32, 33 (1997).
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communities. 8 4  Fifteen states require divorcing parents to
attend what is typically a four-hour instructional program. 8 5
The goal of these programs is to make parents more informed
about their own needs and adjustments to single parenthood,
more alert to the child's needs in adapting to two separate
families, more aware of and attentive to family dynamics, and
better prepared to plan strategies for collaborative parenting.
Even if a state has not previously required education for
divorcing parents, it should mandate it in contested relocation
cases. As Professor Schepard has observed, "Unfortunately,
experience and research demonstrate that the overwhelming
majority of parents would not attend [an educational program]
without strong backing of the court."18 6 Specifically, strategies
for reshaping the nonmoving parent's relationship with the child
after relocation can be discussed and addressed. The intuitive
appeal of these and all other educational ventures is that the
parents can exercise more control over their own behaviors and
make the needed modifications to accommodate relocation. 8 7
Moreover, there are now some formal evaluations of parent
education programs that suggest effectiveness in terms of an
enhanced appreciation of the impact of divorce upon children
and the need for parenting adjustments. 88 Direct consultation,
the absence of denigration between parents, low conflict, and
facilitating the child's relationships with parents and their
extended families are all associated with successful divorces and
184 Solveig Erickson & Nancy Ver Steegh, Mandatory Divorce Education
Classes: What Do the Parents Say?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 889, 895-96 (2001).
185 See id. at 896-99 (discussing variables in the organization of parenting
education programs). See generally, Debra A. Clement, 1998 Nationwide Survey of
the Legal Status of Parent Education, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 219
(1999). Perhaps the most ambitious and well-researched curriculum is the five-hour,
two session PEACE (Parent Education and Custody Effectiveness) Program, a joint
project of Hofstra University School of Law, Hofstra University School of Education
and the Interdisciplinary Forum on Mental Health and Family Law. See Andrew
Schepard, Newly Mandated PEACE/NYC: The Lawyer's Role, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 19,
1999, at 3; see also The Philosophical Model: The Marriage and Family Therapy
Graduate Program, http://www.hofstra.edu/Academics/Graduate/Programs/ GP_
MFTphilosophicalmodel.cfm.
186 Schepard, supra note 185.
187 See Andrew Schepard, Evaluating P.E.A.C.E. (Parent Education and
Custody Effectiveness), N.Y. L.J., May 11, 2000, at 3 (noting that parent
effectiveness programs can be effective in meeting aspirations).
188 See generally Richard D. Mathis et al., Evaluation of Participant Reactions
to Premediation Group Orientation, 17 MEDIATION Q. 153 (1999) (analyzing a
modest parent self-reporting study).
[Vol.77:291
2003] FAMILY RELOCATION DECISION MAKING
the minimization of harm to the child. 189 These positive results of
parent education should also reduce many of the difficulties of
relocation. The strongest factor predictive of whether a
noncustodial parent will remain involved in and committed to a
continuing relationship with his children, even more predictive
than the frequency of parent-child contact, is the quality of the
post-divorce relationship between the parents.190  The
overarching social policy to be achieved aims to encourage the
parents to acknowledge that each has a significant parental role
to play that will continue, despite distance, until their deaths or
the death of the child.
D. Mediation of the Terms of Relocation Accommodation
The custody literature demonstrates that mediation is a
superior process to adversarial negotiation or court-imposed
decree in arranging custody, visitation, and other decision
making.191 Indeed, most states either expressly authorize or
mandate mediation for the resolution of caretaking disputes. 192
189 See generally Hetherington et al., supra note 138.
190 See Valarie King, Nonresident Father Involvement and Child Well-being:
Can Dads Make a Difference?, 15 J. FAM. ISSuES 78, 78 (1994); see also Lamb et al.,
supra note 133.
191 See generally Andrew J. Bickerdik, Divorce Adjustment and Mediation:
Theoretically Grounded Process Research, 18 MEDIATION Q. 181 (2000) (same).
Professor Scott properly notes that in the early stages of separation and divorce,
parents may be so emotionally compromised that their judgment is impaired. See
Scott, supra note 98, at 646-47. Those dangers are minimized when instead of
negotiating their future custodial arrangements or bargaining through counsel, the
parents engage in the more protective process of mediation. However, I acknowledge
that the use of mediation in family controversies is not without its critics. Professor
Fineman has argued that the combined recent trend toward joint custody and
mediation is a dangerous professional power shift from lawyers and the legal system
to the "helping professions." Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional
Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV.
727, 727-28, 728 n.2 (1988). She points out that the justice of any resolution
depends upon the reflection of widely held values and the accuracy of fact-finding,
essentials best preserved by laws and the legal process. Feminist theoreticians have
also expressed alarm, arguing that mediation cannot correct persistent power
imbalances that disadvantage mothers in the private ordering of custody resolution.
See generally Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the
Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992). While these concerns are legitimate,
I believe that greater harm is produced for children by the adversarial system. See
generally Marsha Lichtenstein, Mediation and Feminism: Common Values and
Challenges, 18 MEDIATION Q. 19 (2000).
192 Some states explicitly authorize the use of mediation for the resolution of
child custody and visitation disputes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.080 (Michie
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As of 1995, thirty-three states required a good-faith attempt at
mediation in child custody disputes, and other states make
mediation referrals discretionary for the courts. 193 As with
parent education programs, there is no reason why a similar
mediation mandate ought not to be extended to relocation
disputes. 194 Undoubtedly, mediation was little used in the past
as a means of resolution because notice was typically given
shortly before the planned relocation. 195 However, with adequate
relocation notice provisions, there is no reason why mediation
cannot be accomplished as efficiently as litigation. Even if the
mediation attempt fails, the parents have probably acquired
useful knowledge in framing the issues of controversy and
identifying the needs of the child. Mediation is itself a form of
parent education and seems well worth any additional time and
expense. A consensual process seems clearly preferable to the
fang and claw of litigation.
Mediation can be defined as "an informal process in which a
neutral third party helps others resolve a dispute or plan a
transaction but does not (and ordinarily does not have the power
to) impose a solution.... The desired result is an agreement
suited to the needs of the parties."1 96 Because mediation ensures
a more balanced discussion of alternatives and results in
1995); CAL. FAM. CODE § 20019 (Deering 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-53a
(West 1995); IDAHO CODE § 32-1402 (Michie 2001). Other states more generally
authorize the use of mediation for the resolution of any type of dispute. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. §16-7-101 (Michie 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-305 (West
1995).
193 Erickson & Ver Steegh, supra note 184, at 894.
194 Mediation is possible even when the parents do not presently desire a face-
to-face meeting nor contemplate such a future encounter, due for example to family
violence. Although in the usual custody mediation the parents are in the same room
for one or more meetings with the professional mediator, other types of mediations
involve "bilateral negotiation": the mediator moves between the parties who remain
apart in separate rooms, though they usually know each other's identities. See
generally Charles A. Bethel, The Use of Separate Sessions in Family Mediation, 2
NEGOTIATION J. 257, (1986).
195 See Hanley N. Gurwin, Settling Relocation Issues Through Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 20 FAM. ADVOC. 24, 24 (1997).
196 LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS 4 (1987). In its more familiar guise as a method for resolving present
disputes, mediation has been similarly defined by statute as "a process whereby a
neutral third person called a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution
of a dispute between two or more parties. It is an informal and non-adversarial
process with the objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually
acceptable and voluntary agreement." FLA. STAT. ANN. §44.1011(2) (West 1998).
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agreements which are more resistant to later deadlocked
disputes, it seems ideally suited as a process for parents facing
the difficult issues of relocating.
Mediation can achieve two primary goals. First, it ensures
that any resulting agreement is both knowledgeably and
voluntarily confected, which requires that the parents identify
and articulate their desires and concerns. Mediation models
collaborative decision making, enabling the work of future
parenting. The second primary achievement of mediation is that
it is more effective than the adversarial or negotiating process
for minimizing future conflicts between the mediating parents. 197
Specifically, in their ten-year study of the effects of the
mediation for divorcing parents, Pearson and Thoennes found
that those who mediate report better spousal communication
patterns, a vital skill to long distance collaborative parenting,
than those who do not.198 Other researchers have found that
parental conflict is lower for parents who mediated earlier
agreements rather than litigating them.199 Although not a
panacea for eliminating all future disputes, mediation does
produce greater client satisfaction and less litigation than do
court-imposed orders or lawyer-negotiated settlements. 200 If
mediation fails, it is a signal to courts that the relationship of
the parents is hostile and disobedience of orders and judgments
may also occur. Consider the following:
[Child custody adjudication, including relocation decision
making, can be likened to] a grade-B western, divided into good
guys and bad guys, each of the parties set[ting] out to
demonstrate, not that it was in the best interests of the
197 See generally Joan B. Kelly, Parent Interaction After Divorce: Comparison of
Mediated and Adversarial Divorce Processes, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 387 (1991)
(reporting a study finding substantial but short-term effects for mediating couples).
198 See generally Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation:
Reflections on a Decade of Research, in MEDIATION RESOLUTION 9-30 (Kenneth
Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt eds., 1989).
199 See generally Katherine Kitzmann & Robert Emery, Child and Family
Coping One Year after Mediated and Litigated Child Custody Disputes, 8 J. FAM.
PSYCHOL. 150 (1994).
200 See generally Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in
Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 L. & Soc'y REV. 585,
(1987); Kelly, supra note 86, at 387; WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 71;
Schepard, supra note 152, at 717-18 (reporting more recent unpublished Minnesota
data from a study of custody cases). The greatest proportion of cases that return to
court for post-judgment modification are those in which the court determined the
child's custody plan after a full adversary hearing.
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children that their custody be awarded to them, but that it was
in their best interests that it not be awarded to the other .....
What had started out as an inquiry in aid of the best interests
of the child thus quickly turned into something that was
anything but. In fact, it is hard to imagine anything more
injurious to the best interests of the children than the hearing
ultimately conducted by the court to determine those best
interests, for if there was ever any ray of hope that the parties
might join together in common cause for the benefit of their
children, in most instances, when the trial was finally
concluded, it was extinguished forever.201
Although courts are necessary when parents become
deadlocked, empirical findings now are truistic: the best decision
makers for the resolution of child custody disputes and
relocation controversies are the parents themselves. 202
Mediation is reminiscent of the old adage about teaching the
skill of fishing rather than giving fish as charity: through
mediation, the parents can be taught how to resolve the issues
imbedded in relocations, and the reconstituted family can be self-
reliant, reducing or eliminating the role of the courts.
Mediation proposals might be too costly if the present
system worked reasonably well. However, litigation relocation
disputes in the United States is a costly, burdensome, erratic,
and antagonistic process, which leaves thousands of children at
risk of having parents who are even more antagonistic toward
each other after the judgment.
Proposals of counseling, parent education, and mediation
are naive if the goal is to eliminate all parental disputes over
relocation. The more modest aim of this Article is to discourage
as much conflict and adversarial litigation as possible through
substantive rule choice and offer litigation alternatives to
parents who cannot privately resolve their dispute. These
proposals are directed at those parents who might be encouraged
to collaborate if they realized the importance of cooperation for
201 LENARD MARLOW & S. RICHARD SAUBER, THE HANDBOOK OF DIVORCE
MEDIATION 75 (1990).
202 See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in
Custody Litigation: Modification of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. COLO. L.
REV. 495, 506 (1975); Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 288
(1975). See generally Diane Trombetta, Joint Custody: Recent Research and
Overloaded Courtrooms Inspire New Solutions to Custody Disputes, 19 J. FAM. L.
213 (1980-81).
[Vol.77:291
FAMILY RELOCATION DECISION MAKING
their child and could see options for continued involvement as
parents despite geographical distances.
CONCLUSION
American culture today undeniably countenances "more
fluid notions of what constitutes a family,"20 3 yet the law's
dominant conceptualization of exclusive parenthood within a
nuclear family still affects individual behavior and
idealizations. 20 4 In earlier times, young children were permitted
to live with distant relatives or were sent off to boarding schools;
few parents feared such change would destroy their relationships
with their offspring. But the modern paradigm of the nuclear
family that prays together and plays together certainly affects
relocation statutes, judicial decision making, and non-custodians
who wage war. The paradigm hinders our reimagining
relocation as a permissible and probable change which can bring
benefit to the child and which, with some creative alternative
processes, can be accomplished without denying, terminating, or
damaging the relationship between the nonmoving parent and
the child. Relocation need not be a win-lose, negative sum,
game.
Divorce is not a single event, although the legal system fixes
it with the pin of the decree date. The world reinforces that
conceptualization of divorce; it is one in a series of boxes to be
checked: "single," "married," "widowed," "divorced." Early social
science literature fell into the same misconception, seeking to
study the reactions of children "to divorce" as if divorce were a
203 Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for
Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV.. 997, 1008 (1995).
Estimates based on 1980 census figures are that 40% of all American children spend
at least some period of their childhood living with families in which one or both
biological parents are absent. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,
Special Studies Series P-2, No. 380, Marital Status and Living Arrangements:
March 1982, A5, Table F (Wash. D.C. 1983). From 1970 to 1994, the percentage of
White children living in such families more than doubled (10.5%-23.9%), and the
percentage of Black children increased by a third (41.5%--66.6%). Statistics for
children of Hispanic origin are unavailable for the 1970 census. As of 1994, 36.5% of
these children were living with families lacking one or both biological parents.
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P20-484, Marital Status and
Living Arrangements: March 1994, Fig. 3, x (Wash. D.C. 1996).
204 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed,
70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984).
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single event. Human behaviorists have now documented what
anyone who ever experienced divorce already knew: divorce is a
process of adjustment, a series of transitional stages through
which the principals pass, although a few occasionally become
enmeshed and never emerge. Similarly, the post-divorce
residence decision made by a custodian of children is not likely to
be immutable. Renesting, including relocation, is part of the
divorce adjustment process.
Unfortunately, far too many proposed relocations trigger the
renewal of parental hostilities. 205 Thus, it is important that we
attempt to encourage new kinds of parent-child connections and
bonds over time and spaces. We lack fully completed cultural
norms for distanced parent-child relationships, but there is no
reason why they cannot be developed, just as we have developed
norms for blended families and bicultural adoptions. The goal of
family law and its courts is larger and more important than
simply laying out the grounds for divorce or attempting to factor
the meaning of "the best interests of the child." That is a role
that looks to the past and the present but ignores the future; it is
an "as is, where is" philosophy. The family law system, as some
reformers have urged, should attempt to improve the future of
the family by reducing conflict, providing adequate support,
equipping "parties [with] the tools to restructure their lives," and
"enabl[ing] the family to manage its own affairs."20 6
Consequently, modern social policy should facilitate the
private ordering of all issues emanating from relocation, rather
than attempt to ban or resolve relocation by adversarial
litigation, except in cases in which mediation attempted in good
faith has failed. When litigation is unavoidable, the burden of
proof should be on the parent who is creating the disruption; in
other words, the relocating parent who proposes to significantly
modify the current allocation of parental time with the child.
The relocating parent should demonstrate his efforts to mediate,
to restructure the parental relationships and the responsibilities,
and, if necessary, to persuade the court that the direct benefits
205 See generally Spitzer, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
206 High-Conflict Custody Cases: Reforming the System for Children-
Conference Report and Action Plan, 34 FAM. L.Q. 589 (2001) (reporting a conference
sponsored by the ABA Family Law Section and The Johnson Foundation at the
Wingspread Conference Center, Racine, Wisconsin, Sept. 8-10, 2000); see also
Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1015, 1037 (1985).
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to the child brought by the move will outweigh any loss to the
child from the reconfiguration of his relationship with the
nonmoving parent. In litigation, most parents seeking in good
faith to relocate ought to prevail. Most importantly, the proper
inquiries are made: could these issues be resolved without
adversarial conflict? Has the disruptive parent made all
reasonable efforts to sustain the relationship between the child
and the other parent? A proposed rule acknowledges the
importance to the child of maintaining a vital relationship with
both parents by asking if the move will more than compensate
the child for the loss of the familiar past ways of interacting with
the other parent?
The relationship with that beloved parent need not end, but
it will change just as it changes with new work schedules,
remarriage, illness, and the maturation of the child. In an era
when childhood stretches out for nearly two decades, there are
limitless opportunities for parenting, even across separate
households as well as across distance. Social policy, reflected in
our relocation process, should encourage and assist parents in
adapting to inevitable change, respecting the needs of each
other, and accommodating their relationships with the child they
hold in common.
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